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ÖZET 
Siyasi parti elitlerinin sosyal profillerini çeĢitli demografik faktörler 
oluĢturmaktadır. Bu faktörler, aynı zamanda siyasi partilerin karakteristik özelliklerinin 
ortaya çıkarılmasında da belirleyici olmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, parti elitlerinin sosyal 
profillerini içeren bilgiler; partilerin ideolojik duruĢları, eleman seçme yöntemleri, 
teĢkilat baĢarısı ve parti içi güç iliĢkileri/dengeleri konularının araĢtırılmasını mümkün 
kılmaktadır. Siyasi parti elitleri arasında yerel siyasi parti elitlerinin sosyolojik profilleri 
de çeĢitli partiler arasındaki benzerlik ve farklılıkların anlaĢılması için karĢılaĢtırmalı 
olarak incelenebilir. Yerel siyasi parti elitlerinin yaĢ, cinsiyet, doğum yeri, eğitim, 
meslek/iĢ durumlarının incelenmesi yoluyla içinde bulundukları partilerin 
sosyoekonomik kompozisyonunun analiz edilebilmesi mümkündür. Aynı zamanda, bu 
tarz çalıĢmalar sayesinde yerel parti elitleri ve seçmenler arasındaki bağlar, benzerlik ve 
farklılıklar da daha kapsamlı olarak anlaĢılabilir. Bu nedenle, yerel parti elitlerinin 
sosyo kültürel ve ekonomik özelliklerinin araĢtırılması, parti tabanında seçmeni kimin 
temsil ettiğini gün ıĢığına çıkarmayı sağlayabilir.  
Bu tez, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) ve Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 
(CHP)‟nin en son il ve ilçe teĢkilat baĢkanlarının profillerinin temel özelliklerini analiz 
ederek “AKP ve CHP‟nin yerel teĢkilat baĢkanlarının sosyoekonomik profilleri 
arasındaki benzerlik ve farklılıkların Türkiye siyasi hayatındaki sonuçları nelerdir?” 
sorusuna cevaplar önermektedir. Bulgular, iki parti arasındaki gözle görünür en büyük 
farklılığı yerel parti baĢkanlarının meslek/iĢ durumlarının oluĢturduğunu 
göstermektedir. 
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ABSTRACT 
Various demographical factors establish the profile of political party elites; these 
factors can, in turn, affect the characteristics of political parties. Information regarding 
the profiles of party elites thus enables the investigation of a party‟s characteristics 
terms of its ideological stance, recruitment patterns, organizational success and internal 
power relations/balances. Among political party elites, the sociological profiles of the 
local party elites can also be comparatively studied for various political parties in order 
to understand the similarities and differences across the parties. By scrutinizing age, 
gender, place of birth, education, occupation/job of local party elites, analyzing the 
socioeconomic composition of the parties is possible. Moreover, such studies enable 
developing a more comprehensive understanding about the ties, similarities and 
differences between the party elites and the electorate. Thus, the examination of socio-
cultural and economic characteristics of the local political party elites makes possible 
unearthing who is elected to represent the electorate at the grassroots level of party 
organizations as well.  
By analyzing the main characteristics of personal profiles of the current leaders 
of the provincial and district branches of the Justice and Development Party [AKP] and 
the Republican People‟s Party [CHP], this thesis suggests answers to the question of 
“What are the political consequences of the differences in the socio-economic profiles 
of the local party chairpersons for the AKP and the CHP in Turkish politics?” The 
findings show that, among other variables, occupation/job of the local chairpersons 
creates the most visible difference between these two parties. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Elites have been subjects of a number studies in terms of their economic and 
political power relations, involvement in decision-making processes and positions that 
they occupy (Mosca, 1939; Mills, 1956; Michels, 1962; Rustow, 1966; Pareto, 1968; 
Parry, 1969). Depending on the sources and implementation of their power, their 
characteristics and the way the researchers approach them will differ. Among these, 
political elites may be defined as one of the subsets of a more broadly defined social 
elite group, and political party elites may be identified as a subset of the political elites.  
 
Figure 1.1: Local party elites as a subset of national elites 
 
 
One of the most crucial questions about the political elites has been the 
following: Do personal characteristics of the political elites influence the political 
system in a country? Depending on this question, various scholars have studied 
background characteristics of different political elite groups. Many scholars put effort in 
analyzing how political elites and their features affect politics (Edinger and Searing, 
1967: 430; Quandt, 1969: 3). Previous research suggests and proves that the social 
backgrounds of the political elites give clues about the political environment of the 
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countries. Deducing from this argument, the following ideas rise: The political party 
elites and their social backgrounds may become one of the defining ideological 
characteristics of their political parties. More specifically, depending on the age, gender, 
birth place, education and occupation/job of the recruited political party elites, the 
political parties may shift on the ideological spectrum. For example, a party which is 
composed of relatively young, highly educated party elites may be defined as more 
modern than a party whose elites are far older and less educated. Also, socioeconomic 
characteristics of currently employed party elites may become one of the defining 
elements of recruitment patterns of the party. So, the analysis of these party elites‟ 
profiles may enable the researchers to predict future political characteristics of the 
parties. Thus, the positions of these party elites become crucial in understanding the 
party per se. 
A fairly large body of research revealed that the social backgrounds of the 
Turkish political elites including parliamentarians and political party elites unearth the 
characteristics of the politics and political parties of Turkey (Frey, 1965; Tachau, 1973; 
Turhan, 1991; Çarkoğlu et al., 2000; Uysal and Topak (2010). Comparing different 
parties in terms of the similarities and differences of the socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics of their local party elites will yield interesting clues about 
why and how these political parties differ on policies as well as ideological positions on 
most political issues that Turkey faces. Thus, focusing on the features/personal profiles 
of the local party elites who occupy the provincial and district branches of the political 
parties, it would be possible to observe the socioeconomic composition of the parties 
which would help us to better understand and appraise the existing differences and 
similarities among the Turkish political parties. 
The subjects of this thesis are specifically the provincial and district branch 
chairpersons of the Justice and Development Party [Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP] 
and the Republican People‟s Party [Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP]. The main aim of 
this thesis is to analyze the social backgrounds of these party elites in terms of their age, 
gender, localism (birth places), education and job/occupation; and compare the two 
parties depending on the characteristics of their local party elites. Moreover, this thesis 
aims to reveal a comparison between these local party bosses and overall demographic 
characteristics of the Turkish society as well.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
2.1. Political Elites in Comparative Perspective 
Edinger and Searing argue that “The stated or implicit underlying assumption is 
that leadership, social background and recruitment patterns (of elites) will facilitate 
understanding of the political system because we can infer from them a good deal about 
the system's homogeneity and dominant values, about elite-elite relationships.” (Edinger 
and Searing, 1967: 430). Similarly, other goals of various researchers for studying the 
characteristics of political leaders have been explaining and predicting the attitudes and 
behaviors of these leaders (Quandt, 1969: 1).  
As indicated above, large numbers of studies were conducted by social scientists 
on political elites. Among the classical studies, Pareto and Mosca seemed to have 
employed the term “political elite” to refer to a “governing class” as Pareto had done, or 
to a “political class” as Mosca had often done (Lenczowski, 1975: 1). Michels also 
considered the human society as divided into ruling and non-ruling groups, and he 
suggested an “iron law of oligarchy” that encompassed all social organizations under 
the leadership of the political elites existed. According to this perspective, elites occur 
in almost all organizations and they are the real decision-makers (Michels, 2005: 342-
356). For Michels, the defining factor of being an elite is the positions that the 
individuals own in organizations and their use of power provided by these positions 
(Turhan, 1991: 32). Moreover, Mills underlined that: 
“The power elite is composed of men whose positions enable them 
to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary men and women; they 
are in positions to make decisions having major consequences. Whether 
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they do or do not make such decisions is less important than the fact that 
they do occupy such pivotal positions...” (Mills, 1956: 3-4). 
Thus, the chances of the political elites to influence many people via their decisions 
make these elites crucial and thus the subjects of research. Quandt highlighted that quite 
a number of studies of political institutions cover quantitative data on the backgrounds 
of the elites and again a significant amount of non-quantitative research deals with the 
experiences and social origins of the political leaders (Quandt, 1969: 3). Although the 
practice of background analysis of the political elites has been criticized by some 
authors (i.e. Schlesinger, 1966) arguing that the profile information does not work for 
predicting future behavior of these elites, many scholars and research have proven the 
opposite. For example, Matthews (1954) argued that the voting behavior of legislative 
elites has been predicted quite well on certain issues by analyzing their social 
backgrounds. Moreover, Bendix (1953) argued that “…a study of politics should be 
concerned with the social composition of the members and leaders of different political 
organizations…” because such kind of information will yield clues about the “political 
goals” of these leaders (Quandt, 1969: 4). 
The research on Turkish political elite also circles around similar ideas. On the 
political elite features and their changes over time in Turkey, Tachau (1984) gave 
historical information and unearthed the significant roles of modernization supporters 
played among the political elites in the country. Also, Heper and Keyman examined 
how the state elite and its relations with the people are shaped by observing the political 
patronage linkages in the political tradition of Turkey (Heper, Keyman, 1998). Besides 
these studies, ones that examine Presidents, their characteristics and the reflections of 
these on the political culture of Turkey have been conducted. To illustrate, the study on 
President Kenan Evren which was conducted by Dodd (1994) in the book edited by 
Heper and Evin, and on President Turgut Özal which was studied by Heper (Heper, 
1994) can be underlined. However, indeed, these studies on the presidents are somewhat 
different from the ones dealing with the deputies, party leaders and the professional 
officers of the parties as these studies are much more related to the internal party 
politics. Thus, beyond such studies, looking at the features and personal backgrounds of 
the party leaders can also enable researchers to build up an understanding about the 
existing power relations and internal party organizations. As an example, in terms of 
political party leadership, Payaslıoğlu examined the socio-political basis of party 
5 
 
leadership in Turkey (Payaslıoğlu, 1970). Since there is a leader-oriented and/or a 
leader dominated party structure in Turkey, the personal characteristics of the party 
leaders are significantly effective on both internal and national party politics. 
Approaching the parliamentary elites in terms of their social backgrounds may 
yield the analysis of the local level political party elites, which are the chairmen of the 
local branches, to become even more competent. Thus, being knowledgeable about 
these parliamentary elite studies in Turkey may provide a better understanding. 
 
2.2. Earlier works on Parliamentary Elites 
Among parliamentary elites, deputies and cabinet ministers have been the 
primary subjects to various studies across countries. These elites have been given such 
importance since they are “the core group of decision makers” (De Almeida and Pinto, 
2005: 4). The research generally covers the recruitment patterns of these elites and the 
changes in the composition of them (De Almeida, Pinto and Bermeo, 2005). For 
example, The Iranian political elite and its existence under patrimonial system of the 
country regarding the educational background of these elites (Bill, 1975); the political 
elite of Iraq and its educational, occupational, socioeconomic, and ethnic and religious 
backgrounds (Marr, 1975); the impact of socio-economic transformation on the process 
of parliamentary elite recruitment/circulation in Lebanon (Khalaf, 1980); and the nature 
of parliamentary elite turnout depending on social and political changes in Israel 
(Gutmann, 1980) have been analyzed. By the same token, the change of the social 
background profiles of ministerial elites depending on regime changes/types in Spain 
has been studied as well (Linz, Jerez and Corzo, 2005). Similar to this study, Lane and 
Ross investigated how “generational, occupational and institutional” backgrounds of the 
elites (i.e. the legislative elite) shifted during time and a new elite emerged in Supreme 
Soviet (Lane and Ross, 1994). 
Studies about the members of Turkish Grand National Assembly [Türkiye 
Büyük Millet Meclisi – TBMM] and their social backgrounds prevail in the literature. 
In his book titled The Turkish Political Elite, Frey studied the personal backgrounds of 
the deputies in the TBMM (Frey, 1965). According to the existing literature, this study 
has been one of the most prominent and guiding studies. Frey dealt with the 
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occupational and educational backgrounds of the deputies from 1920 to 1957. In 
addition to this topic, he also looked at the birth place of the deputies, whether they 
were born in the provinces which they represented, and then approached the concept of 
“localism” in terms of the positioning of political elite by emphasizing the deputies‟ 
relations with their constituencies per se (Frey, 1975: 59). Frey also focused on the 
educational backgrounds of the deputies and the reflections of these on the 
modernization of Turkey (Frey, 1970). By covering several of Frey‟s ideas, in terms of 
the relationships between the deputies and local branches of the political parties, Dodd 
underlined Frey‟s argument about the orientation of these deputies towards the 
provincial party organizations in order to be influential on them (Dodd, 1979: 64-65). In 
a similar vein, in Nieuwenhuijze‟s book on the social ranking in the Middle East, 
Tachau conducted his study on the social backgrounds of Turkish parliamentarians and 
unearthed the fragmentation among the Turkish political elite in the National Assembly. 
In that study, Tachau specifically analyzed several social aspects of the parliamentarians 
-who were elected in 1973- such as their education, occupation, marital status, and birth 
place (Tachau, 1977). He concluded that the composition of 1973 Parliament resembled 
to the parliaments of 1920, 1950 and 1961 in several respects; however, ideological 
fragmentation was higher compared to previous parliaments, and especially the 
occupational background of the deputies have changed dramatically “with the 
appearance of  sizeable contingents of teachers and religionists” (Tachau, 1977: 312).   
Frey‟s tradition has been influential through time, and several researchers 
continued to analyze Turkish parliamentarians regarding their social backgrounds that 
Frey covered. However, various scholars employed different elements of social 
backgrounds depending on their own selections in terms of the importance of these 
elements. For example, ġaylan (1976) approached the topic only from an occupational 
perspective and described the occupational composition of the parliamentary elite in 
Turkey between the years 1961 and 1976. From a different angle, KıĢlalı (1976) 
examined the education, age, and gender dimensions of the parliamentarians in Turkey 
and unearthed the changes in the composition of these political elites between 1920 and 
1973. Similarly to KıĢlalı, Turhan (1991) drew attention to the social backgrounds of 
the parliamentary elites in terms of age, occupation and education, and using these 
criteria, explained the alternation of these elites from 1876 to 1980. Although these 
studies covered different aspects of the parliamentarian elites, one commonality of them 
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is indicating the changes in the characteristics of Turkish parliamentarians as 
correspondent to recruitment patterns of Turkish political parties. Moreover, these 
studies concluded that the composition of the assembly during time differed accordingly 
to social alternation in Turkey. From a different aspect, Kalaycıoğlu (1995) analyzed 
the Turkish parliamentarians‟ “attitudes towards their parties and opponents,” “political 
beliefs and values” and “social backgrounds” in 1984 and in 1988. The author 
unearthed the relationship between the deputies and the constituents regarding 
clientelistic linkages and found that constituency demands from the deputies have been 
mostly personal ones. Concomitantly, a significant number of the deputies (more than a 
half) have been spending their time –as a regular activity- on “finding jobs and 
providing other services or benefits for constituents” (Kalaycıoğlu, 1995: 47, 49).  
A more recent study which is conducted by Sayarı and Hasanov, relying on the 
data about the deputies‟ social backgrounds and their turnover in the assembly, 
scrutinized the effects of the 2007 general elections in Turkey on the parliamentary elite 
structure. In this study, the authors analyzed similar elements of social backgrounds 
which are unearthed in the previous studies as well, and argued that a rise of a new 
political class of parliamentary elites in Turkey is observed. Unlike previous research, 
an important note to point out in this study is that Sayarı and Hasanov looked at the 
“knowledge of the Arabic language” among the deputies along with the gender, age, 
education and occupation (Sayarı, Hasanov, 2008). It seems as if that specific language 
knowledge of the deputies seems to be helpful in defining the ideology of the party to 
which they belong.  
Similar to the studies of Sayarı and Hasanov and of Frey, Sesli and Demir also 
studied the deputies‟ social backgrounds in the Turkish National Assembly from 1920 
to 1950 in order to demonstrate the link between the party and its elites. According to 
their findings, knowing the social profiles of the deputies gives us the chance to better 
understand the power structures of Turkey. Moreover, an analysis of political 
development in Turkey may be done with the help of the data on changes in profiles of 
the deputies.   (Sesli, Demir, 2010). Additionally, Gökçe‟s research on the deputies of 
the 23
rd
 National Assembly showed that the social backgrounds of the political elites 
give information about the structures of the political parties and the political 
participation types/ways of the society (Gökçe, 2011). Arslan, in a separate study, also 
used elite theory to analyze power structure in Turkey (Arslan 2006); in his several 
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studies he also analyzed the social backgrounds of the Turkish deputies (Arslan, 2005). 
Moreover, Arslan also conducted a research on the representation of women among the 
Turkish political elites (Arslan, 2004). As it can be understood, the studies on the 
deputies cover a wide area in the literature on Turkey. 
In a more recent study, Sayarı and Dikici-Bilgin also shared this fact (emergence 
of the large body of parliamentary elite studies) but added that compared to deputy 
analysis, the number of studies analyzing ministerial elites -which are political elites as 
well- have been very few in Turkey. Thus, these scholars focused on ministerial elites 
and their social backgrounds covering “age, gender, education, locality, occupation, 
length of ministerial career, parliamentary party affiliation” (Sayarı and Dikici-Bilgin, 
2011: 739). Analyzing the demographical and political characteristics of the ministerial 
elites, the authors draw a socioeconomic and political composition of these elites, and 
revealed the visible changes/trends of this composition over time. At this point, the 
following argument can be supported: Since the ministers occupy very crucial positions 
and they have the chance to control significant resources, studying the personal 
backgrounds of these elites would provide the researchers to better understand their 
attitudes, and give chance to predict future acts of such elites. With a similar rationale 
and likewise to such research, political party elites of Turkey are analyzed in terms of 
their social backgrounds in various studies.   
 
2.3. Earlier Works on Party Elites 
As a subset of political elites, (political) party elites have been also specifically 
subjected to several studies. These studies have been conducted to explain the 
organizational structures, internal power relations of the parties, and the penetration of 
the party elites to the larger society in which they operate.  
Party leadership and role of the party elites are some of the concentrated tasks in 
terms of party elites (Martz, 1992). In terms of party head quarters and the public/field 
offices of the party, Biezen analyzed the relations between these offices in the European 
parties and argued that the central office of a party is the dominant part although 
individuals in public offices also impact the central office (Biezen, 2000). Bowman and 
Boynton (1966) focused on and underlined the importance of the grassroots party 
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officials and their roles/activities in the party organization. Moreover, these researchers 
(1966) also studied the local officials of the parties in Massachusetts and focused on the 
recruitment of these officials. The authors also identified the importance of the 
backgrounds of the activists in order to explain party recruitment and political 
participation in the party organization.  
Besides these studies, in terms of the party organization and the success of the 
parties, Webb and Kolodny underlined the importance and the significant effects of the 
party professionals/payroll professionals of the parties, especially in their central offices 
(Webb, Kolodny, 2006). Additionally, Hirschfield, Swanson and Blank (1962) focused 
on the profiles of the political activists (elected committeeman of the selected parties) in 
Manhattan and unearthed the differences and similarities between the three parties that 
operated in the politics of New York City. In above mentioned studies, one of the main 
points is that the relations between the party and the people in the local offices can be 
examined by looking at the personal backgrounds of the party elites who are in the local 
branches. When we consider the studies on Turkish party elites, we observe similar 
scenarios as in those above-mentioned studies. 
 
2.3.1. Earlier Works on Turkish Party Elite 
 The specific literature on Turkish party elites points to, as a general statement, 
the political party elites (both the central and local ones) have a significant influence on 
the party, and social and political interactions of the party with the society and other 
organizations in the society (Uysal and Topak, 2010: 12). To illustrate, identifying with 
whom these party elites interact may unearth the ties between the party and nature of the 
electorate which will enlighten the characteristics of targeted voters of the party. Thus, 
the features/profiles/social backgrounds of these party elites do offer accurate evidence 
about Turkish politics.  
In this juncture, one may hypothesize that characteristics of the party elite also 
affect internal party structure. Those characteristics of the elite enable us to define a 
party as authoritarian or democratic; traditional or modern; and conservative or liberal. 
In terms of these definitions, existing literature also focused on the local party elites 
alongside the party leaders, deputies and professional officials of different parties. 
10 
 
However, in comparison to the large body of research on parliamentary elites in Turkey, 
the research on local party elites has been limited. Nevertheless, the existing literature 
does provide helpful pathways for analyzing local party elites. 
Tachau, in a research other than his parliamentary elite study, analyzed the 
provincial party organizations of major parties in Turkey. More specifically, Tachau 
examined the social and political backgrounds of the personnel of provincial party 
organizations including the local party chairmen. He indicated that the main dimensions 
to be analyzed are: age, so as to enable a better understanding of the process of 
recruitment and social change between generations; place of birth, for analyzing 
horizontal social mobility; occupation for unearthing social diversification; and 
education “as a general condition of modernization” (Tachau, 1973: 284-285). Tachau 
highlighted in his study that the Turkish political parties are modern ones. Similar to 
Frey‟s study on Turkish political elite and the guiding spirit emanating from this 
research, the research of Tachau has become a path definer for the others. 
In a similar vein, the research conducted by TESEV between 1996 and 1997 in 
Turkey also covered the analysis of social background of local party members of 
various political parties. By interviewing with 782 party members, the researchers 
describe the composition of the local party elite in terms of demographical 
characteristics such as birth place, age, education, gender and occupation; and political 
characteristics including the duration of membership to the parties, the old and new 
positions of the members, and their candidacy to public offices (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000). 
Although the study encapsulated other local party members along with provincial 
chairmen, it unearthed useful information about these chairmen. An interesting point 
focused in the study is the birth place of the fathers of the interviewed party members. 
The authors analyzed the information about paternal birth places and found that the 
fathers of the provincial party bosses in 17 metropolitan cities were born in a different 
area. The authors then concluded that in terms of partisan subjects (of the study), the 
metropolitan areas along with Marmara, Ege and Akdeniz regions are the migrant-
receiving areas whereas Karadeniz, Doğu and Güneydoğu Anadolu regions are migrant-
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sending places, and this fact gives clues about localism degrees depending on different 
regions (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000: 60-61).1  
In a more recent research conducted between 2007 and 2009, that employed 
interview and in-depth interview methods, Uysal and Topak (2010) also examined the 
social background of the local party elites of several major parties of Turkey. The 
authors mainly analyzed the following features: gender, age, education and occupation 
of the local party elites. However, they also included family relations of those elites, and 
the effect of these relations on the elites being in their political positions (Uysal and 
Topak, 2010: 59-116). In this study, the “fathers” again became an important point to 
analyze. But rather than birth place, the ideological stance of the fathers of the party 
elite has been analyzed by these scholars. They then concluded that the fathers of the 
party elites have been influential on the ideological position of these elites and their 
attendance into politics (Uysal and Topak, 2010: 60). Another research covering 
“parental party identification” of the voters conducted by Kalaycıoğlu (2010) also 
proves a similar impact of the parents on their children‟s ideological stance. Thus, 
firstly as voters and then as party elites, there are enough reasons for us to suspect that 
the local party chairpersons may also be affected by their parents in developing their 
political selves and adopting political ideologies and affinities. So, along with the other 
demographical factors, analyzing the family backgrounds of these elites may also 
provide explanatory factors for future prediction about their attitudes.  
Furthermore, Ayata (1992)‟s research on the organizational structure and 
ideology of the CHP is parallel to above mentioned studies to a certain extent. Although 
Ayata has not analyzed the social backgrounds of the local party bosses directly, she 
gave helpful information about the ties between the members, delegates and party 
(local) leaders of the CHP in terms of various ways of political participation. While 
exploring those ties, Ayata specifically analyzed several political participation methods 
such as patronage, brokerage and clientelism which rely on personal linkages between 
the political elites and the society. As Kalaycıoğlu (1995) unearthed clientelistic 
relations between the deputies and the constituents, ties between the local party elites 
                                                          
1
 Although the birth places of the fathers of the local party bosses are not the subjects of 
this thesis, localism degrees of the local party bosses will be analyzed in the data 
analysis part with the help of their own birth places, and a comparison will be drawn in 
terms of migrant-receiving and migrant-sending areas of Turkey. 
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and the electorate may be analyzed for understanding the parties‟ attitude about these 
relations. These personal ties are shaped depending on the mutual interests of the 
politicians and the electorate; and generally political and economic interests may yield 
the emergence of such relations. Thus, Ayata explored the socioeconomic positions of 
those individuals who are dealing with the party as party elites. More specifically, Ayata 
investigated the socioeconomic and political characteristics of local organizations and 
members of the CHP in two towns (Kaleli and TaĢlık). The author emphasized that in 
order to unearth the impacts of new social and political structures on the organization 
and ideology of the party, analyzing the differences between these two towns would be 
more helpful (Ayata, 1992: 16). Hence, Ayata made in-depth interviews with various 
party members (including two provincial chairpersons of the CHP) and conducted 
surveys for collecting data from delegates between 1977 and 1980. Likewise to other 
studies, this research specifically ascertained that analyzing the socioeconomic 
structures and characteristics of the party members, delegates and chairpersons may be 
helpful in order to understand a party‟s ideological stance and organizational structure.        
Obviously, earlier works revealed the possible advantages of analyzing 
background profiles of Turkish local political party elites. Nonetheless, explaining the 
positions, rights and responsibilities of these local party elites of the AKP and the CHP 
before analyzing their social backgrounds may reveal that why these local party elites 
are noteworthy for research.    
 
2.4. Regulations on the Organizational Structure of the Political Parties in Turkey 
The regulations of the interactions between different organs and elements of 
political parties are defined as “structural relationship” [yapısal bağlantı], and while 
some parties have clarified, detailed and definite rules in terms of the relations of 
various parts of the party, some others do not (Özbudun, 1974: 62). Turkish political 
parties are defined as having strong structural relations with their detailed intra-party 
(internal) regulations (Özbudun, 1974: 63; BektaĢ, 1993: 40). Political parties in Turkey 
have their party by-laws [içtüzük] for intra-party regulations; however, the political 
parties and their main principles are regulated by the Law on Political Parties [Siyasi 
Partiler Kanunu – SPK] in Turkey. The current SPK (Law No: 2820) of Turkey was 
enacted in 1983 depending on the 1982 Constitution of Turkey (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000: 
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104). Along with the Article 1, the Article 2 of this law reveals the aims of it. This 
second article demonstrates that the SPK covers the provisions for the foundation, 
organization, activities, mission, authority and responsibilities, property acquisition, 
income and expenses, auditing, closure and being closed down of the political parties.
2
 
Besides, SPK proposes a common and binding organizational form/method for all the 
parties, meaning that no party may found another organizational structure which is not 
in accordance with this law. This organizational method is parallel to the administrative 
organization of Turkey. Consequently, the organizational structures of the Turkish 
political parties are very similar to each other due to the regulations of the SPK (BektaĢ, 
1993: 39; Erdem, 2001: 85). According to the Article 7 of the SPK, the organization of 
the political parties are composed of central bodies (head quarters) with provincial [il], 
district [ilçe] and municipality [belde] organizations; TBMM groups, provincial 
councils and municipal council groups. With an additional sentence
3
, the article shows 
that establishment of several subsidiary organs such as women‟s branch and youth 
branch, and representatives in foreign countries may be provided by party by-laws. As it 
is evident, no other local organization below the municipality level is allowed in the 
law. Although the law enables the political parties to have representatives in city 
neighborhoods [mahalle]s and villages [köy] (BektaĢ, 1993: 40), the political parties 
cannot found lower level local organizations, for example, in sub-districts [bucak]. In 
addition, according to this party law, the political parties cannot organize their offices 
(other than above mentioned ones) regarding age, occupation, gender, geography or 
institutions (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000: 107), thus, regardless of socioeconomic, ethnic and 
geographical differences between regions, only one organization model is allowed for 
the whole country (Erdem, 2001: 93). Such restrictions have been deeply criticized for 
disabling/limiting the political parties in sub-districts and lower levels, and creating 
                                                          
2
 SPK, Article 2 – (Amended: 12/8/1999 - 4445/1): [Bu Kanun, siyasi partilerin 
kurulmaları, teşkilatlanmaları, faaliyetleri, görev, yetki ve sorumlulukları, mal 
edinimleri ile gelir ve giderleri,denetlenmeleri kapanma ve kapatılmalarıyla ilgili 
hükümleri kapsar.] Retrieved from: 
http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.2820.pdf 
 
3
 SPK, Article 7 – (Amended: 21/5/1987 - 3370/1): [Siyasi partilerin teşkilatı; merkez 
organları ile il, ilçe ve belde teşkilatlarından;Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Grubu ile il 
genel meclisi ve belediye meclisi gruplarından ibarettir. (Ek Cümle: 12/8/1999 - 4445/3 
md.) Siyasi partilerin tüzüklerinde ayrıca kadın kolu, gençlik kolu ve benzeri yan 
kuruluşlarla, yabancı ülkelerde yurtdışı temsilciliği kurulması öngörülebilir.] Retrieved 
from: http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.2820.pdf 
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difficulties for the parties while interacting with the society (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000: 105-
106).  
Nonetheless, in practice the local branches are “crucial in linking the party with 
civil society and collateral organizations” (KumbaracıbaĢı, 2009: 128). Thus, it is 
noteworthy to explore the provincial and district branches of Turkish political parties 
since they are the “nearest” offices to the society. 
 
2.4.1. Regulations on Local Party Chairpersons of the AKP and the CHP 
Articles 19 and 20 of the SPK reveal the regulations on the structure of the 
provincial and district organizations of the political parties in detail. Nevertheless, the 
SPK provides the political parties to regulate their local organizations in terms of certain 
issues. Regarding the SPK, party by-laws of the AKP and the CHP reveal and regulate 
the party organization. Parallel to the Article 7 of the SPK, both the AKP and the CHP 
have all mentioned organizations.  
Table 2.1: Party organizations of the AKP and the CHP according to their party 
by- laws, modified by the amendments of 2012
4
 
The AKP Organization The CHP Organization 
1- Municipality Organization 1- District Organization 
a) Municipal Congress a) District Congress 
b) Municipal Chairman b) District Chairman 
c) Administrative Committee c) Administrative Committee 
d) Executive Committee d) Municipal Chairman 
2- District Organization e) Administrative Committee 
a) District Congress 2- Provincial Organization 
b) District Chairman a) Provincial Congress 
c) Administrative Committee b) Provincial Chairman 
d) Executive Committee c) Administrative Committee 
3- Provincial Organization d) Discipline Committee 
a) Provincial Congress 3- Party Headquarters 
b) Provincial Chairman a) Grand Congress 
c) Administrative Committee b) Party Leader 
                                                          
4
 Table 2.1 has been established by the information given in the party by-laws of the 
AKP and the CHP with 2012 amendments. Moreover, KumbaracıbaĢı‟s study on the 
AKP is noteworthy to refer (see, KumbaracıbaĢı, 2009: 127).  
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d) Executive Committee c) Party Assembly 
4- Party Headquarters d) Central Administrative Committee 
a) Grand Congress e) Supreme Discipline Committee 
b) Party Leader 4- Additional Organizations 
c) Central Administrative Committee a) Women's branches 
d) Central Executive Committee b) Youth branches 
5- Additional Organizations 5- Groups (and General Assemblies) 
a) Women's branches a) The TBMM party group 
b) Youth branches b) CHP Members of Provincial Assemblies 
c) Other branches c) CHP Members of Municipal Assemblies 
6- Groups (and General Assemblies)  
a) The TBMM party group  
b) AKP Members of Provincial Assemblies  
c) AKP Members of Municipal Assemblies  
 
The AKP by-law reveals the levels of the party organization in its Article 17.
5
 
Thus, the AKP by-law covers regulations of all of the above mentioned branches of the 
local party organizations. In addition to those organizations of the AKP, the by-law of 
that party regulates the village and neighborhood representatives as well.  
Article 31 of the AKP by-law stipulates the regulations concerning the 
jurisdiction of the district chairpersons of the party. According to this article, the district 
chairman shall be directly elected by the district congress with secret ballot. The district 
chairman shall be responsible with the coordination, execution and monitoring of the 
district level activities and works. He/she represents the district organization of the 
party. Moreover, the regulation limits the election of the same chairman with 3 ordinary 
successive periods at most.
6
 Similarly to this one, Article 36 of the AKP by-law 
                                                          
5
 AKP by-law, Article 17: [Teşkilat Kademeleri: Ak Parti teşkilat kademeleri; belde, 
ilçe, il ve Genel Merkez teşkilatlarından, belediye meclisi grupları ve il genel meclisi 
grupları ile Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Parti Grubu’ndan ibarettir. Ayrıca parti 
teşkilat kademelerinde, kadın ve gençlik kolları ile diğer yan kuruluşlar ve yurt dışı 
temsilcilikleri oluşturulur.] Retrieved from: http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-
tuzugu 
 
6 AKP by-law, Article 31: [İlçe Başkanı: İlçe başkanı, ilçe kongresi tarafından gizli 
oylama ile tek derecede seçilir. Partinin ilçe düzeyindeki çalışma ve faaliyetlerinin 
koordinasyon ve yürütümünü sağlar, denetimini gerçekleştirir ve ilçe teşkilatını temsil 
eder. Aynı kişi, en fazla üç olağan dönem ilçe başkanı seçilebilir.] 
Retrieved from: http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-tuzugu 
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regulates the election, duty and responsibilities of the provincial chairmen of the 
party. According to this article, the provincial chairman shall be directly elected by the 
provincial congress with secret ballot. The chairman shall be responsible with the 
coordination, execution and monitoring of the provincial level activities and works. 
He/she represents the provincial organization of the party. Moreover, the regulation 
limits the election of the same chairman with 3 ordinary successive periods at 
most.
7
 Both the district and provincial chairpersons may be re-elected if they lay off.    
Parallel to the Article 7 of SPK, and similar to the AKP, the CHP also has all 
levels of organizations and branches indicated in this by-law. Moreover, the CHP by-
law indicates that the party has working groups in neighborhood / village [muhtar] areas 
which are under the responsibility of the district branches. According to the Article 28 
of the CHP by-law, the district chairman of the CHP shall be directly elected by the 
district congress with secret ballot. Moreover, the district chairperson is the direct 
representative of the party within the district borders. Additionally, he/she shall analyze 
the economic, social and local problems of the district, create solutions, and built up 
strong ties with various civil society organizations, trade unions, and local media.
8
 
Article 32 of the CHP by-law demonstrates the responsibilities and rights of the 
provincial party bosses. The provincial chairman of the CHP shall be elected by the 
provincial congress with secret ballot directly. Moreover, the provincial chairperson is 
the direct representative of the party within the provincial borders. Additionally, s/he 
shall analyze the economic, social and local problems of the province, create solutions, 
and built up strong ties with various civil society organizations, trade unions, and local 
                                                          
7 AKP by-law, Article 36: [İl Başkanı:  İl Başkanı il kongresi tarafından gizli oylama ile 
tek derecede seçilir. Partinin il düzeyindeki çalışma ve faaliyetlerinin koordinasyon ve 
yürütümünü sağlar, denetimini gerçekleştirir ve il teşkilatını temsil eder. Aynı kişi, en 
fazla üç olağan dönem il başkanı seçilebilir.]  
Retrieved from: http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-tuzugu 
 
8
 CHP by-law, Article 28: [İlçe Başkanı: İlçe başkanı, ilçe kongresince gizli oyla seçilir. 
İlçe çevresinde Partinin temsilcisidir. İlçe başkanı, başkanı olduğu ilçenin ekonomik, 
sosyal ve yöresel sorunlarını inceler, bunların çözümüne yardımcı olur, belde 
başkanlarıyla düzenli olarak toplanır, parti örgütüyle, meslek ve sivil toplum 
örgütleriyle, sendikalarla, yaygın ve yerel basınla ilişkileri sağlıklı tutar; onların 
sorunlarıyla ilgilenir; çözümlerine katkıda bulunur; bu kuruluşlarda partililerle 
işbirliği yaparak başarılı olmalarına yardımcı olur.]                                                            
Retrieved from: http://www.chp.org.tr/?page_id=657 
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media.
9
 Furthermore, both the provincial and district chairpersons preside over the local 
party congresses and other meetings within their constituency.  
 The literature has indicted the importance of the political elites regarding their 
capability of controlling resources and power. Similarly and obviously, for both parties, 
the provincial and district chairpersons have remarkable positions which provide them 
with the opportunity of controlling the local resources of the party and being a key 
person in decision making processes. Due to this fact, these local party elites are worth a 
study due to their pivotal positions.  
 
2.5. Research Question 
“By studying political parties we imply that the party is a meaningful unit of analysis.  
Yet we go above the party as a unit, for we also study the party system. By the same 
token we can go below the party as a unit and study, thereby, the party subunits.” 
(Sartori, 1976: 71) 
 
In reviewing the literature, one can observe that although dozens of studies have 
been conducted on the above-mentioned political elites as party leaders, deputies in the 
national assemblies and the payroll professionals of the political parties, little is known 
about the characteristics of the party bosses at the provincial and district offices of the 
main parties in Turkey. Thus, investigating the social backgrounds of the provincial 
party chairpersons promises to fill a vacuum in the existing literature. The main 
rationale for such an analysis is that the features of these party elites can give us an 
important chance to compare different parties and their organizational, structural and 
ideological features. As previously indicated, the parliamentary elites have been given a 
significant importance for analyzing the parliamentary composition, recruitment 
                                                          
9 CHP by-law, Article 32: [İl Başkanı: İl başkanı, il kongresince gizli oyla seçilir. İl 
çevresinde Partinin temsilcisidir. Başkanı olduğu ilin çevresindeki ilçelerin ekonomik, 
sosyal ve yöresel sorunlarını inceler. Bunların çözümüne yardımcı olur. İlçe 
başkanlarıyla düzenli olarak toplanır. Parti örgütüyle, meslek ve sivil toplum 
örgütleriyle, sendikalarla, yaygın ve yerel basınla ilişkileri sağlıklı tutar; onların 
sorunlarıyla ilgilenir; çözümlerine katkıda bulunur; bu kuruluşlarda görevli Partililerle 
işbirliği yaparak başarılı olmalarına yardımcı olur.] 
Retrieved from: http://www.chp.org.tr/?page_id=657 
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patterns of the parties and political consequences of these. Similar to deputies, the 
profiles of the provincial party bosses provide us with important clues about the 
characteristics of the political parties, but there are also differences between the deputies 
and these chairpersons.  
Thus, at this point, it is important to raise the importance of the provincial and 
district party bosses in Turkey and the analysis of their socioeconomic characteristics. 
In order to unearth their importance, indicating the similarities and mainly the 
differences between these bosses and the deputies can be helpful.  
Both deputies and the provincial bosses represent their party and its ideology. 
Also, both of these elites reveal the organizational success levels of the parties. These 
elites are seen as the “visible faces” of the parties and they built up linkages with 
electorate directly; however, the positions, duties, goals and interests of the deputies and 
the bosses of the provincial/district branches of the parties differ from each other at 
some point. First of all, the (offices of the) elites in the local branches are 
(geographically) closer to the electorate and they are usually more available than are the 
deputies of a political party in the TBMM. Although the deputies also meet with the 
electorate in local areas, local chairpersons may have more interaction with the 
electorate within their constituency. This difference is because the provincial bosses 
have the chance to show up more frequently than the deputies in the local areas and by 
the help of their local organization, their penetration into the society can be easier than 
the deputies. For example, organizing social activities in their provinces or districts can 
provide them with the chance of taking attention of the electorate and strengthening 
their linkages with the electorate.
10
  
In addition, the people, who want to get information about a party, apply to the 
local branches of the party due to the fact that these branches are generally much more 
accessible than the party center or the deputies. Membership issues also affect the 
relationship between the individuals and the local branches of the parties. This effect is 
because, the people who would like to become a member of a party should apply to the 
                                                          
10
 As mentioned in the previous section, the local chairpersons coordinate local 
activities and organize meetings with local electorate and/or other organizations 
according to the party by-laws. 
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local branches of that party. 
11
 In a similar context, the party elites are influential on 
public opinion. Meaning that the party leaders or party elite have chance to lead or alter 
voter preferences (Orriols and Lavezzolo, 2010). Furthermore, analyzing the social and 
political profiles of the local elites may give the clues about who governs the field 
organizations of the parties, and who are (how) represented in these organizations 
(Uysal and Topak, 2010: 13). 
Unlike the responsibilities of the deputies, it can be said that these bosses have 
more responsibility to meet with the electorate to answer their questions about the party 
and to give accurate information since these local chairpersons are the representative of 
the party within their workplaces. Of course, the deputies also have such 
responsibilities; however, they are seen as more “individualistic” than the provincial 
party bosses who have the responsibility to act collectively in their branches and to 
control the organization. Tachau indicated that “The personnel in the provincial 
executive committees represent the highest level below the national organization” and 
they form the “formal rule between their local party organizations and the national 
center.” (Tachau, 1973: 284). Here, one can infer that the provincial party bosses are 
much more integrated to the organizational structure of the party and thus their social 
backgrounds can give accurate information about the features of this organization. So, 
these profiles can be indicators for explaining the internal party politics. 
Another importance of the local party chairpersons is that they may climb the 
political stairs over time. To put in a different way, the positions of these party elites 
may enable them to become future deputies or occupy upper level positions in the 
future. For example, some members of the provincial executive committees may 
become -potential- future political leaders (Tachau, 1973: 284). Moreover, the position 
of local party elites is effective not only for their own careers but also for the other 
political elites. To illustrate, if they are decisive in determining/nominating the deputy 
candidates, or at least if their support is needed by these candidates, legislative careers 
of the deputies may depend on these local party elites (Jones et al, 2001: 1). 
                                                          
11
 The party by-laws regulate the membership conditions.  According to the indicated 
procedures, the individuals who would like to become a member of a party should apply 
to the district organization of the party depending on their place of residence. For 
further information please see the Article 7 of the AKP by-law via the link: 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-tuzugu and the Article 8 of the CHP by-law 
via the link: http://www.chp.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/CHP-Tuzuk.pdf 
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Regarding the above-mentioned topics, in order to study the 
linkages/relationships between the political party elite and the party as a whole and 
compare these links for different parties, the following question emerges as a plausible 
motive for investigation: “What are the main features of the political party elites in 
different parties?” In a similar but more specific context, by analyzing the main 
characteristics of personal profiles of the current leaders of the provincial and district 
branches of the AKP and the CHP, this thesis suggests answers to the following 
question: “What are the political consequences of the differences in the socio-economic 
profiles of the local party chairpersons for the AKP and the CHP in Turkish politics?” 
 
2.6. Hypotheses 
Along with the research question, this thesis suggests several hypotheses to be 
tested. As a prevailing theory on elites in general, the social characteristics of the elites, 
their recruitment patterns and the features of the society were defined/assumed as 
related to each other (Bottomore, 1964). Furthermore, “Changes in the criteria of elite 
recruitment and, hence the social characteristics of elites, are taken as indicators of 
social change, and vice versa (Hoffman-Lange, 1987: 27). Inferring from these ideas, 
background characteristics of party elites can be taken as indicators of party features. 
Thus, certain characteristics of the social backgrounds of the provincial and district 
party bosses can provide us with clues about the relevant features of the parties.  
For example, several studies estimated to find more party elites who have 
religious education in a conservative party (Sayarı, Hasanov, 2008). The positive 
correlation between conservatism and religious education has been unearthed in other 
studies as well (Kalaycıoğlu, 2007). Not only the party elites but also the voters which 
have religious education background may be more prone to conservatism. In turn, the 
political parties which have such members may show conservative tendencies as well. 
Thus, it is possible to infer that in a conservative party which espouses Islamic values as 
part of its ideology, larger proportions of the local party elites would be expected to 
have a religious educational background, know some Arabic. Contrariwise, it is also 
plausible to posit that a social democratic party will provide greater opportunities for the 
working class members, trade unionists, intellectuals who pronounce social democratic 
values, and women to lead local party organizations of that party. 
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Tachau regarded the political parties as voluntary and “relatively stable and 
enduring” organizations which aim to attain political power with the help of mass 
support; pursue “public interest rather than private gain.” Depending on this definition, 
Tachau also regarded Turkish political parties as modern (in structure and form) 
instruments of questing for power and influence (Tachau, 1973: 282, 283). In addition 
to these features, a modern liberal party would be expected to provide greater political 
career opportunities for the young and secularly educated middle class members who 
affiliate with individual liberties, economic enterprise, freedom of expression and the 
like. Deducing from this idea, this thesis expects that in a modern liberal party, the 
average age of the local party elites is relatively lower and the university education 
levels to be higher than conservative local party elites. Related to this issue, one can 
also foresee that the occupations and/or jobs of the provincial party bosses differ from 
socialist and social democratic parties on the left to liberal and conservative parties on 
the right. To illustrate, in secular or social democratic or liberal parties, such professions 
as academicians, artists, architects and the like occupy a larger proportion than in a 
conservative party, where such jobs artisans/tradesmen have bigger proportions, instead. 
 Furthermore, conservative parties are generally less open to have female party 
elites. On the other hand, in social democratic and liberal parties the proportion of the 
female party elites would be higher, if they implement what their ideological messages 
preach. Additionally, it is expected that a party which particularly emphasizes 
secularism provides female party elites more opportunity to emerge in their local 
branches as chairpersons. 
 Depending on the localism degrees of the local party elites, one can analyze the 
various political ties between these elites and the electorate. If the local party 
chairpersons have their offices in the same province that they born (and live), they have 
the chance to interact with the local people, more than those who do not. Moreover, by 
growing up in the same area with their workplaces, the local chairpersons can observe 
the problems and understand the demands of the electorate of that area more easily 
compared to the ones who do not have such an experience. Additionally, the electorate 
and these local elites may know each other personally. Thus, a possible argument can be 
that in the areas where the localism is high, the personal ties between the local 
chairpersons and the electorate may be more visible. For example, from parliamentary 
elites perspective, Kalaycıoğlu unearthed the relationships between the parliamentary 
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representatives and constituents in Turkey by underlying that “in most rural districts the 
deputies are more visible and proximal, and ties between constituents and their 
representatives can be quite personal” whereas the opposite can be true for most 
metropolitan and urban constituencies (Kalaycıoğlu, 1995: 46). A similar approach can 
be employed while analyzing the local party chairpersons as well. These chairpersons 
can be more visible in their birth places, and if their offices are in the same place with 
their birth places a higher degree of personal ties can be expected. Furthermore, if a 
political party recruits such chairpersons whose birth and work places are same, this 
party‟s relations with the electorate can rely on proximal and personal ties which 
increase the chance of clientelistic linkages.     
 A possible correlation may be found between the financial power of the local 
party chairpersons and the emergence of clientelistic relations as well. If the 
chairpersons have access to financial resources easily, or if they have wealth which they 
can spend for political purposes, the possibility of existence of the clientelistic ties may 
increase. At this point, the occupation and job of these local party elites become 
noteworthy. If a party‟s local chairpersons have occupations or jobs which provide them 
with notable amount of material resources, that party may more prone to adopt 
clientelism.  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA ANALYSIS  
 
3.1. Methodology 
Various methods have been employed for compiling and analyzing background 
information on the political (party) elites. The literature covers dozens of quantitative 
and qualitative studies on the social background of political elites (Quandt, 1969: 3). 
Commonly used data collection methods have been interviews, surveys and 
biographical examinations. Besides these methods, data collection relied on several 
other sources as well. For example, official directories, newspapers, autobiographies, 
memoirs, and historical archives have become other primary sources for the researchers 
(De Almeida and Pinto, 2005: 16).  
As it is indicated in the literature review section, similar background variables 
have been analyzed in the studies. These were age, gender, place of birth, education and 
occupation/job. Along with these, different scholars selected additional variables such 
as wealth, family background, imprisonment (Rustow, 1966). Several scholars have 
provided suggestions about the selections of these background variables. For example, 
Edinger and Searing (1967) analyzed the strength of the effect of various variables on 
the attitudinal features of the political elites and concluded that certain variables may 
provide better predictions about these elites‟ behavior.  
In the studies conducted for analyzing the social backgrounds of the political 
(party) elites of Turkey, again mainly three forms of data collection have been 
employed: interviews, surveys and biographies. Among these three means, interviews, 
especially the in-depth interviews, and surveys provide expanded and detailed 
information about the social backgrounds of the political (party) elites. Thus, various 
researchers choose to use interviews and survey methods (Frey, 1965; Tachau, 1973; 
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Çarkoğlu et al., 2000; Uysal and Topak, 2010). For example, Ali Çarkoğlu et al. (2000) 
used face to face interviews for compiling information about the social backgrounds of 
the members of political party organizations including provincial chairmen in 36 
provinces of six parties. In a similar vein, Uysal and Topak (2010) employed semi 
structured in-depth face to face interview method in order to gather information about 
social backgrounds of the local party elites. Their study covers both the chairmen and 
the executive members of the local party branch in 31 districts. The methods employed 
in such studies may provide detailed information about the provincial and district 
chairmen of the political parties for sure.  
However, in both studies, the authors unearthed several problems they faced 
during interviews for compiling their data. The indicated experience is that some 
interviewees were reluctant to answer the questions and were uncomfortable to give 
personal information about themselves (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000; Uysal and Topak, 2010). 
Similarly, Frey employed survey method in his book The Turkish Political Elite (1965), 
and presented/examined the sources of the background information about the deputies 
that he worked on. The survey method also seems to be fruitful while gathering personal 
information. However, Frey indicated that the direct questionnaires which were given to 
the deputies could not become successful due to weak response rates. He suggested that 
the responses are few; nevertheless, they may be would still be important for the study. 
 
3.2. Data Collection and Analysis 
The data is compiled about the chairpersons of the provincial and district 
branches of two political parties of Turkey, the government party AKP, and the main 
opposition party CHP, mainly from the central offices of these parties. Firstly by face to 
face meetings on July 2012 with the officers/authorized people for the local party 
members, then via e-mails and telephone calls the necessary data was compiled. For 
eliminating uncertain information, additional data was gathered from official web pages 
of the political parties (both central and local offices), newspapers, and other sources. 
The data lies on the biographic information of the local chairmen. Although no 
interview or survey method implemented, the data covers all the local chairmen of the 
AKP and the CHP (2034 chairpersons in total) without creating a sample. Thus, 
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statistically, data compiled for this study may provide better results than did sampled 
ones.  
As indicated in the previous section, many scholars reported that possible 
obstacles in gathering information about political elites have arisen during their research 
(Frey, 1965; Çarkoğlu et al., 2000; Uysal and Topak, 2010). Similar problems have 
emerged during the data collection of this thesis as well. Not only the reluctance of 
several chairpersons to give personal report but also the lack of information on different 
sources such as newspapers and official websites of the parties have been the causes of 
such difficulty. Although the personal information about these chairpersons is not 
secret, some of them were not willing to give information. Moreover, there are internet 
sites of the branches in which the personal backgrounds of these chair persons are 
revealed; however, especially in small provinces or districts, there is less or no 
information except the name of the chair person and the contact information of the 
offices. Thus, the data covers “not available” information to a certain extent 
Nevertheless, the data covers a significant number of cases which may demonstrate the 
overall picture of the social composition of the party elites comparatively. 
In order to create profiles of the party elite, the following variables will be 
employed and analyzed: 
 Age (for revealing the represented age groups in the chairmanship levels) 
 Gender (for understanding the composition of different genders) 
 The place of birth (for analyzing localism levels of the chairpersons) 
 Education (for analyzing the representation of different education levels) 
 Occupation/Job (for creating a social and economic composition of the 
chairpersons) 
 
Since previous works on the party elites cover similar types of information areas, 
analyzing these above-mentioned personal background data can give the chance to 
compare the findings of this thesis with the previous ones as well.  
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3.2.1. Age 
 
Age of the political (party) elites has been the most employed and calculated 
variable. Since it may provide the information about which age groups occupy the local 
chair positions and which age groups are represented in these positions, the age variable 
has been given importance. Quandt (1969) indicated two types of ways for analyzing 
the age composition of the political elites. One of the ways is revealing “the percentage 
of the members of political body falling into each five year age group” which has been 
reported as providing the chance of understanding the “distribution of the cases”. The 
second way is indicating the average age of these political elites. Among these options, 
Quandt specifically emphasized the importance of the average age (Quandt, 1969: 7). 
 
Relying on both ways, analyzing the following calculations will be helpful. 
Figure 3.1 shows the minimum, maximum and average ages of the local party 
chairpersons of the AKP. Similarly, Figure 3.2 reveals the minimum, maximum and 
average ages of the local chairpersons of the CHP. 
 
Figure 3.1: The minimum, maximum and average age of the  
AKP local party chairpersons, 2012 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: The minimum, maximum and average age of the  
CHP local party chairpersons, 2012 
 
 
According to the data, the standard deviation for the AKP chairpersons‟ age is 8,64 
which means that a total 95,4% of these chairpersons are between the ages of 29,15 and 
63,71. For the CHP, the standard deviation is 9,46 which indicates that the age of 95,4% 
Minimum: 21 Maximum: 79 
Average: 51.66 
Minimum: 25 
Average: 46.43 
Maximum: 75 
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of the CHP local chairpersons is in between 32,74 and 70,58. Although the minimum 
age of the CHP is 21, with a 51,66 average, the CHP‟s local chairpersons seem to be 
older than the AKP‟s. Moreover, the distribution of the age reveals that more 
chairpersons drop in 61-70 age range in CHP than the AKP which may increase the 
average age of the CHP local party elites.
12
  
 
  Figure 3.3: Age distribution of the local    Figure 3.4: Age distribution of the local 
    party chairpersons of the AKP, 2012      party chairpersons of the CHP, 2012 
 
 
 
Although the two parties show some difference, their overall picture is not so 
disparate in terms of the age of the chairpersons. The mostly represented age groups in 
both parties coincide with the middle ages (starting from 36 in this case) and older ages, 
though the CHP local party bosses are ten years or older than their counterparts in the 
AKP. However, the population of Turkey is much younger and thus youth seem to be 
less represented among the chairmanship levels of these parties. The age distribution of 
the population of Turkey in 2012 is shown in the Figure 3.5 as calculated by the Turkish 
                                                          
12 In addition to the above mentioned calculations, a paired t-test was conducted to 
compare the age differences between the AKP and the CHP local party chairpersons. 
The test showed that the average age of these chairpersons of the AKP and the CHP are 
significantly different from each other (p-value < 0.0001). A confidence interval 
constructed on the mean age difference indicates that the AKP chairpersons are 
younger. This difference is between 5.2 and 5.3 years, with a confidence of 95%. 
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Statistical Institute [Türkiye Ġstatistik Kurumu – TÜĠK]‟s reports. 13  Obviously, a 
significant portion of the population drops between 0-34 ages which contrasts with the 
situation of the chairpersons of the local party branches. This situation means that an 
important part of the society is under-represented in these levels of both parties. 
Furthermore, this case also provides some clues about the recruitment patterns of these 
parties. Inferring from the results, one tends to argue that these parties, (the CHP more 
so than the AKP), are more willing to recruit elderly and more senior members as 
chairpersons for their local branches.   
 
Figure 3.5: Age distribution of the total population of Turkey, 2012 
 
            
The results unearth not only the recruitment patterns but also the enthusiasm of the 
younger people for working as a local chairperson of these parties. Although both 
parties have some chairpersons whose ages are between 26 and 30, the proportion of 
this group is dramatically lower than the modal age category for the AKP and the CHP 
local party chairs. The local party members themselves may be skeptical about younger 
and relatively inexperienced candidates for the role of a  chairperson, and such a 
proclivity could provide incentives for the more senior members to vie for leadership as 
the young as discouraged from taking part in leadership races.     
                                                          
13
 The data is compiled from TÜĠK‟s statistics relying on Address Based Population 
Registration System in Turkey. Retrieved from: 
http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=945 and 
http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=13425  
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3.2.2. Gender 
 
Gender has emerged as a central issue in the democratic politics of many 
countries in the last two decades. Turkish politics has also witnessed such a 
development as in 1993 Turkey had its first female politician elected as the leader of the 
True Path Party and by default as the Prime Minister as well. However not all studies of 
the party elites have been paying attention to the role of gender in party politics and 
politics of representation factor (i.e. ġaylan, 1976; Turhan, 1991). Nevertheless many 
studies of party elites have shown that the number of female party members seems to be 
dramatically low in Turkey (i.e. Çarkoğlu et al., 2000: 60; Uysal and Topak, 2010: 34). 
Similarly this thesis also observes that the number of female chairpersons of the AKP 
and CHP seems to be dismally low. The Figures 3.6 and 3.7 shows the composition of 
male and female chairpersons of these parties. Among 999 chairpersons of the AKP, 
only 3 are female or just 3‰ of the total. Similarly, only 22 of the 1035 chairpersons of 
the CHP are females which constitutes about 21‰ of all the chairpersons of the CHP. 
Among these 25 local chairpersons out of 2034 party members only one of them, who is 
a CHP member, occupies a provincial chairmanship position. 
  
   Figure 3.6: Gender distribution of the        Figure 3.7: Gender distribution of the  
    local party chairpersons of the AKP,       local party chairpersons of the CHP, 
2012            2012 
 
 
In comparing these numbers, the CHP seems to have 7 times more female 
representation than the AKP at the level of the local party chairs. Relying on the 
hypothesis about the ideological stance of the parties, statistically, this may show that 
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the secular claims of the CHP may indeed be playing some role in the election of more 
female members as local chairpersons. Moreover, a social democratic party would be 
expected to provide greater opportunities for women to lead its local party 
organizations. Nevertheless, the numbers are still so low to assign a great weight to such 
a comparison.  
Figure 3.8: Gender distribution of the local party chairpersons of                          
the AKP and the CHP comparatively, 2012. 
 
 
It seems as if in light of previous research findings the distribution of the male and 
female chairpersons seemed to have stayed similar. Not in a single study, the proportion 
of the female local party chairpersons builds a significant part of the total local party 
chairpersons. For example, Çarkoğlu et al. indicated that the females constituted only 
4% of their sample (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000: 60). Similarly, Uysal and Topak‟s study 
revealed only two female representatives (which were from the AKP only) at 
chairmanship positions (Uysal and Topak, 2012: 34). Thus the findings of this thesis 
coincided with the earlier findings that the gender composition of the AKP and the CHP 
continued to be heavily biased against women. 
As Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10 illustrate, only 19 of the 81 provinces of Turkey 
have female local party chairpersons in total. Among these, Ġzmir has two female 
chairpersons from the AKP and Van has one. Antalya, Ġzmir and Kayseri have two (per 
each) female chairpersons from the CHP whereas Bolu, Aksaray, Balıkesir, Edirne, 
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Elazığ, EskiĢehir, Giresun, GümüĢhane, Ġstanbul, Mersin, Malatya, Kocaeli, Sakarya, 
Sinop, Trabzon and Yalova have one per each. 
Figure 3.9: The provinces which have female local party chairpersons from the 
AKP, 2012 (Colored areas show the provinces with female chairpersons.) 
 
 
Figure 3.10: The provinces which have female local party chairpersons from the 
CHP, 2012 (Colored areas show the provinces with female chairpersons.) 
 
 
The results show that Ġzmir is the one province which has the highest number of 
the female chairperson with four of them serving in both of the parties included in this 
thesis. Interestingly, among the developed cities, Ankara and Adana do not have any 
female chairpersons from neither party. Moreover, as the biggest city of Turkey, 
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Ġstanbul has only one female chairperson who serves at district level (from the CHP). 
These numbers may yield that the female members spreads regardless of socioeconomic 
development of the cities. Except for Izmir all other provinces have at most 2 female 
chairpersons serving at any local branch of the AKP or CHP. Thus, a possible 
interpretation can be the following: the local chairs of both the AKP and the CHP in 
Ġzmir are the most female friendly offices compared to other offices in other cities. This 
fact may indicate that females may find more chances to participate in the more secular 
and thus less gender biased politics in Ġzmir than the other provinces. 
 
The findings may also give clues about the recruitment pattern of the parties. 
Obviously, neither the AKP nor the CHP has a tendency towards being sensitive to 
gender proportionality in the recruitment of local party chairpersons. TÜĠK‟s reports 
reveal that the distribution of the male and female population of Turkey is almost equal 
to each other in 2012.
14
 While this is the case, an extremely low number of the female 
chairpersons demonstrates that almost half of the population is not represented in these 
positions.  
 
Along with the recruitment patterns, another possible reason for these results 
may rise from the decisions of the female party members themselves. If the potential 
female candidates feel themselves under pressure of male dominated party 
organizations, they may lose their ambition to compete in an unfair election for such 
positions. In a similar vein, they may also take such male dominance as granted. 
Inferring from their interviews, Uysal and Topak have underlined that the female 
chairpersons accept and even internalize their marginalization within the party (Uysal 
and Topak, 2010: 35). The females are supposed to have higher educational degrees and 
be much more qualified than the male ones in order to attend politics (Tür and Çıtak, 
2010: 619). Compared to male counterparts, the women are much more prone to face 
negative evaluation by party organizations when they fail to deliver certain services 
which are demanded by the party (O‟Neill and Stewart, 2009). So, female leaders are 
                                                          
14
 According to TÜĠK‟s report, the total population of Turkey was 76.627.384 as of 
31.12.2012; male population was 37.956.168 and female population was 37.671.216. 
Thus the proportion of male and female population was very close to each other. For 
further information, please see the population and demography statistics of TÜĠK from 
the link: http://www.tuik.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelist  
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generally more likely to be punished compared to the male ones. Not only by the party 
itself but by the public at large, the female leaders can be -more easily- evaluated 
negatively. This disadvantage of the females is because the public and media are not 
gender neutral, and “Women seem to be treated much more harshly by the media and 
are much more susceptible to „scapegoating‟ than their male counterparts.” (O‟Neill and 
Stewart, 2009: 739, 753).  Under such circumstances, compared to male ones, female 
leaders may choose either to be much more careful in the chair positions or avoid 
serving in such positions. Thus, these all together may demonstrate that neither the AKP 
nor the CHP creates an environment in which the females could find opportunities to 
run for any number of positions and a certain degree of enthusiasm to work as 
chairpersons. This result is parallel to the fact of low level female participation in 
politics in Turkey, especially in chair positions. For example, not only in local chair 
positions but also in provincial and district mayor positions the number of females are 
very low compared to their male counterparts. Table 3.1 reveals the numbers of male 
and female mayors and municipal council members in Turkey after 2009 Local 
Elections. Obviously, the female proportion is dramatically low in mayor positions. 
This fact unearths that the female participation in such positions is also not so 
encouraged. Going into details, among 27 female mayors, only 4 of them are from the 
CHP and 3 of them are from the AKP.  
 
Table 3.1: Mayors and Municipal Council Members of Turkey by Gender  
(2009 Local Elections) 
Mayors and Alderman of Turkey by Gender (2009 Local Elections) 
  Male Female Total Female (%) 
Mayors 2923 27 2950 %0,9 
Municipal Council Members 30450 1340 31790 %4,2 
           Source: http://www.tbb.gov.tr/belediyelerimiz/istatistikler/genel-istatistikler/ 
 Thus, similarly to the local party chair positions, both parties seem not to 
provide opportunities for female participation in mayoral positions either.
15
 These 
findings together prove that female participation and representation in these positions 
are problematic in Turkish party politics, on the one hand. On the other hand, the 
                                                          
15
 Most of the female mayors are the members of Peace and Democracy Party [BarıĢ ve 
Demokrasi Partisi – BDP]. For more detailed information, please see Table A.1 which 
shows the female mayors of Turkey by province and district after 2009 Local Elections 
at the Appendix. 
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current situation creates a more suitable environment for the male members of the 
parties to play the game of party politics among themselves.    
  
 A notable point here is that unlike extremely low female portion of the local 
chair positions of the AKP, women‟s branches of this party attract many female 
activists. Several interviews with the members of the women‟s branches revealed that 
women participate in these branches in order to deal with problems of the women, 
create solutions to these problems, and reflect the women‟s emotions, abilities and 
organizational skills in conducting political activities (Tür and Çıtak, 2010: 617). 
Nevertheless, many of these members underlined that in the AKP a resistance against 
the female participation into politics is visible which may decrease the number of 
female members in the party. Moreover, some of the females have not preferred to work 
with the male counterparts of their own accord. However, some of the women also 
highlighted that this kind of a difficulty will be solved by time as working practice with 
the females improve (Tür and Çıtak, 2010: 617). In terms of female participation, 
mostly appreciated measure has been the party leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan‟s decision 
on compulsory attendance of both provincial women‟s branch and youth branch 
chairpersons to the meetings of provincial chairpersons of the party (Tür and Çıtak, 
2010: 620). Thus, although the female provincial and district chairpersons are not high 
in number, several women can attend to the meetings of the provincial chairpersons. 
Nonetheless, other internal regulations of the party (emerging from Teşkilat İç 
Yönetmeliği) reveal that the provincial chairpersons have responsibilities for helping the 
organization of the provincial branches on feminine affairs, and making these branches 
work in accordance with the main units of the party. A similar regulation is available for 
the district branches as well. Thus, the local chairpersons seem to have more 
administrative power than these women who have offices in women‟s branches. This 
may yield that a male dominant administrative structure has control over the party. 
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3.2.3. Place of Birth 
Starting with Frey (1965), the place of birth of the political elites including local 
party chairpersons has been a core variable of the studies. Comparing their places of 
birth and their places of work the levels of localism of these elites have been analyzed. 
Previous research on the political party elites reported a high level of localism of these 
elites. For example, in Tachau‟s study, 87 party elites out of 100 were born in the same 
province or region as their workplaces. The findings of this thesis somewhat support the 
previous results. The data show that 799 chairpersons of the AKP out of 999 were born 
within the same province in which their offices operate. Moreover, 812 chairpersons out 
of 1035 of the CHP were born in the borders of the provinces in which they work for 
the party.
16
 Thus, the degree of localism seems to be significantly high for both parties. 
 
Table 3.2: Localism Degrees of the Local Party Chairpersons of  
the AKP and the CHP, 2012. 
Localism Levels of the AKP and the CHP 
Local Party Chairpersons  (2012) 
 Local-Born Nonlocal-
Born 
Total 
AKP 799 200 999 
CHP 812 223 1035 
       
 
Literature also reveals that in the provinces and regions which are migrant-
receiving ones, the degrees of localism are lower than those migrant-sending provinces 
and regions. To illustrate, Tachau‟s study showed that “the more populous and well 
developed provinces of the West and South have lower proportions of locally born 
politicians” compared to other cities (Tachau, 1973: 278). Moreover, analyzing the 
information about the birth places of the fathers of the local party elites, Çarkoğlu et al. 
indicated that, for these elites, the metropolitan areas, Marmara, Ege and Akdeniz 
regions are the migrant-receiving places whereas Karadeniz, Doğu and Güneydoğu 
Anadolu regions are the migrant-sending places (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000: 60-61). 
                                                          
16
 For calculating the localism level, the birth place of the chairpersons, their work place 
and the provinces that cover these places compared. If the chairperson was born in 
anyplace in a province, and if he/she works within the borders of that province, it is 
calculated as “local-born,” otherwise, “nonlocal-born” it is. Moreover, the nonlocal-
born category covers the ones who were born abroad. For detailed list of the birth 
places, please see Table A.1 and Table A.2 at Appendix. 
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However, the findings of this thesis, while supporting some aspects of the previous 
research, offer different results.  
 
Figure 3.11: Localism levels by provinces for AKP, 2012 
(The darker the color, the greater the increase in localism.) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.12: Localism levels by provinces for the CHP, 2012 
(The darker the color, the greater the increase in localism.) 
 
 
 
 Figure 3.11 reveals the localism degrees by provinces for the AKP and the 
Figure 3.12 illustrates the same for the CHP. The localism degrees start from 50% with 
the lightest color and reaches 100% with darker colors. So, for each province, at least a 
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level of 50% localism is guaranteed. For both parties, Ġstanbul, which is a migration-
receiving and developed city, has one of the lowest levels of localism as expected. 
 
However, other migrant-receiving cities do not reflect the expected trend for 
both parties. According to TÜĠK‟s report, between the year 2011 and 2012, Ġstanbul, 
Ankara, Ġzmir, Antalya, Bursa and Kocaeli have received the highest levels of 
migration, respectively. Relying on this fact and the previous findings, the expected 
localism levels in these places are lower than those in the others. However, no similar 
trend emerges for both parties. For example, Ankara shows different localism levels for 
the AKP and the CHP. In Ankara, 18 out of 19 chairpersons of the AKP were local-born 
whereas 4 out of 20 chairpersons of the CHP were local-born. Moreover, while localism 
level of the CHP in Antalya is high, it is lower for the AKP. Also, Mersin and Adana 
which are metropolitan cities show different localism levels for both parties as well. 
Nevertheless, in Batman, ġırnak, Van and Hakkari, localism level of the local party 
chairs is high for both parties. 
 
As indicated in the previous sections, increase in localism may be an indicator 
for increased personal ties between the local party chairpersons and the constituents. 
The chairpersons who work in their birth places are children of that land (local boy) and 
thus they can build more proximal relations with the local social communities and their 
networks, and concomitantly, higher degree of personal ties can be expected in such 
places where localism is high. The findings of the thesis indicate that both the AKP and 
CHP have the same tendency to recruit those chairpersons whose place of birth is in the 
same province with their work places. This may indicate that potential personal 
relations may emerge with the help of such recruitment patterns. In turn, these parties 
may also be defined as employing clientelistic ties. In consequence of high localism 
levels for both parties, one can argue that both parties may be prone to establish 
personal ties with the electorate. Especially in the cities in which the localism degree 
reaches to very high levels, such ties may be observed more than often than not.       
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3.2.4. Education 
Educational background seems to be more difficult to use in comparative studies 
(Quandt, 1969: 7). From country to country, the educational institutions and their 
features may especially differ from each other, which is a situation that may create 
comparison problems. However, since this thesis compares Turkish political party 
elites, no such problem occurs at least in terminology. Although it seems obvious that 
not all of the educational institutions provide similar knowledge in only one country, the 
problems arising from the major differences which occur between these institutions 
among countries lessen while analyzing intra-country characteristics. 
 
The educational background of the local chairpersons of the AKP and the CHP 
have been analyzed by reference to mainly seven categories or types of formal 
education (after excluding missing cases).
17
 Data demonstrate that the educational 
background of the chairpersons seem to be similar for both parties. A significant 
amount of the chairpersons of both parties has high school or bachelor degrees. This 
situation implies that high level educational backgrounds are accorded importance when 
it comes to the provincial and district chair positions (Uysal and Topak, 2010: 44). 
 
Figure 3.13: Education levels (educational backgrounds) of the local party 
chairpersons of the AKP and the CHP, 2012 
 
                                                          
17
 Depending on the Turkish education system, the categories were defined as literate 
(okur yazar), primary education (ilkokul), secondary education (ortaokul), high school 
(lise), two-year university degree (ön lisans), bachelor (lisans), masters (yüksek lisans – 
excluding PhD degrees). Since data does not cover any illiterates or higher education 
beyond masters, no other category was defined.  
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Figure 3.14: Educational Backgrounds        Figure 3.15: Educational Backgrounds 
of the AKP local party chairpersons,            of the CHP local party chairpersons,   
       2012                         2012 
 
 
 Although the portions of the chairpersons who have masters' degrees are visibly 
small, the level of the education seems not to be low among these local elites. This fact 
is also in accordance with the previous studies which reveal an upper middle education 
level of the local party elites. According to these earlier studies, university graduates 
were high in number among local party elites (see, i.e., Tachau, 1973: 285; Çarkoğlu et 
al., 2000: 64; Uysal and Topak, 2010: 44-48). For example, among these studies, 
Tachau (1973)‟s study revealed that 41% of the local party elites had university 
education. Çarkoğlu and others (2000) showed that over 32% (highest portion among 
other categories) of the local party elites had bachelor degrees. Similarly, Uysal and 
Topak (2010)‟s study showed that 58% of the local chairpersons hold college 
(yüksekokul) and university degrees. Moreover, Tachau analyzed the educational 
background as a general condition of modernization (Tachau, 1973: 285). Regarding 
this view, it is possible to say that as educated local party chairpersons occupy higher 
proportions, the parties become more modernized. Relying on this relationship, both the 
AKP and the CHP may be defined as modern in terms of educational backgrounds of 
the chairpersons. Indeed, Tachau (1973) has defined the Turkish political parties as 
modern in his study as well (as mentioned previous sections). Although the AKP was 
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not in Turkish politics at that time, it has similar characteristics with some of the right 
wing parties investigated by Tachau in terms of education variable.  
 
Several of the AKP local chairpersons indicated in their biographies that they 
had religious education (İmam Hatip) background which may yield conservative 
tendencies of these people. As Sayarı and Hasanov (2008) and Kalaycıoğlu (2007) 
mentioned, such educational background may be an indicator of conservative 
tendencies. For the CHP, no detailed biographical information is available for education 
except for the degrees earned, thus, it is not possible to observe whether there are any 
chairpersons who had any religious school experience or not. This situation may be a 
result of the data collection procedures followed by the party organization or no one had 
attended a religious school, or -if they had- they failed to indicate it.  
 
 Compared to education level of the population of Turkey, the local party TÜĠK‟s 
reports, -excluding 6 and lower age groups- a bit more than 10% of the total population 
of Turkey hold college, university, master and doctorate degrees. Table 3.3 shows the 
educational background of Turkish society depending on the graduated educational 
institutions/levels for 2012.  
 
Table 3.3: Educational background of the population of Turkey, 2012  
 (depending on the graduated educational levels)                                                                     
(Foreigners were not included.) 
Educational Background of Turkey, 2012 
(6 + age groups) 
 
Graduated Educational Level Total % 
Illiterate 2,788,757 4% 
Literate but not graduated 14,058,334 21% 
Primary School (5 years) 15,220,028 22% 
Primary School (8 years) 12,669,905 19% 
Secondary School and/or Equivalent Schools 2,849,999 4% 
High School and/or Equivalent Schools 12,096,830 18% 
College and/or University 5,913,187 9% 
Masters Degree 416,741 1% 
PhD Degree 122,619 0% 
Not Available 1,740,979 3% 
Total 67,877,379 100% 
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Visibly, a big amount of the population is in between the categories of “literate but not 
graduated,” and “8 year compulsory primary school education.”18  
 
This situation is an indicator for a significant educational difference between the 
society and the local chairpersons of the AKP and the CHP. For example, although the 
number of primary school graduates in Turkey is notably high, a small portion of the 
AKP and the CHP local party chairpersons are primary school graduates. Thus, it is 
possible to argue that the less educated individuals cannot generally occupy the local 
chairs of the two parties, and in turn, these people have little chance to be represented in 
those positions. Moreover, it is not contingent that these political parties tend to recruit 
chairpersons who are as educated as possible. The previous research has come up with 
some supportive statements with the help of the interviews done with party elites. The 
stated assumption is that these party elites generally think that for being a party 
chairperson, bachelor/university education is necessary. Thus, high level education, 
especially the university education is seen as an important benchmark in political 
competition (Uysal and Topak, 2010: 46). 
  
 In addition to the above mentioned points, the data reveals that the importance of 
university education becomes distinctive between the provincial and district 
chairpersons as well. Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 show that most of the provincial 
chairpersons of both parties have bachelor degrees. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18
 In Turkey, the 5 year compulsory primary education had been re-designed as 8 year 
compulsory primary education by the Law 4306 at 18.08.1997. Moreover, a gradual 12 
year compulsory education had been adopted by the Law 6287 at 30.03.2012. For 
further information, please see National Education Statistics for Formal Education in 
Turkey (2012 – 2013) prepared by the Ministry of National Education of Turkish 
Republic via the link: 
http://sgb.meb.gov.tr/istatistik/meb_istatistikleri_orgun_egitim_2012_2013.pdf  
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Table 3.4: Educational Background of the Local Party Chairpersons of the AKP 
(2012) 
Educational Background of the Local Party Chairpersons of the AKP (2012) 
Education Level Provincial 
Chairperson 
(Number) 
Provincial 
Chairperson 
(%) 
District  
Chairperson 
(Number) 
District  
Chairperson 
(%) 
Primary Education 2 3% 72 8% 
Secondary Education 2 3% 121 13% 
High School (Lise) 7 9% 289 31% 
Two-year University Degree 4 5% 100 11% 
Bachelor 52 65% 245 27% 
Masters 6 8% 26 3% 
Not Available 7 9% 66 7% 
Total 80 100% 919 100% 
 
 
Table 3.5: Educational Background of the Local Party Chairpersons of the CHP 
(2012) 
Educational Background of the Local Chairpersons of the CHP (2012) 
Education Level Provincial 
Chairperson 
(Number) 
Provincial 
Chairperson 
(%) 
District  
Chairperson 
(Number) 
District  
Chairperson 
(%) 
Literate 0 0% 33 3% 
Primary Education 1 1% 111 12% 
Secondary Education 3 4% 110 12% 
High School (Lise) 23 28% 276 29% 
Two-year University Degree 0 0% 1 0% 
Bachelor 45 56% 273 29% 
Masters 1 1% 11 1% 
Not Available 8 10% 139 15% 
Total 81 100% 954 100% 
 
 When it comes to district chairpersons, the importance of education still 
remains; however, high school graduates and the ones who have two year university 
degrees have also more chance to occupy district branches. Such findings may indicate 
that both parties have tendency to recruit university educated chairpersons for provincial 
positions whereas they have more tolerance in district chair positions by recruiting high 
school graduates and two year university graduates as well.  
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Last but not least, regional differences are observable in terms of educational 
backgrounds of the local party elites. Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 reveal the educational 
backgrounds of the local chairpersons of the AKP and the CHP by regions. According 
to the findings, Marmara region is the one with the highest number of local chairpersons 
who have bachelor degrees for both parties. In the AKP case, Doğu Anadolu and 
Karadeniz regions seems to have least university graduated chairpersons. On the other 
hand, in the CHP case, Güneydoğu Anadolu and Doğu Anadolu regions have the lowest 
number of university graduates.  
 
Table 3.6: Educational Background of the Local Party Chairpersons of the AKP 
by Region (2012) 
Educational Background of the AKP by Region (2012)  
Region 
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Akdeniz  
(Mediterranean) 0.00 8.49 13.21 17.92 13.21 38.68 3.77 4.72 
 
100 
Doğu Anadolu  
(Eastern Anatolia) 0.00 6.20 14.73 47.29 5.43 16.28 3.10 6.98 
 
100 
Ege  
(Aegean) 0.00 8.96 13.43 23.13 11.19 36.57 2.24 4.48 
 
100 
Güneydoğu Anadolu  
(Southeastern Anatolia) 0.00 8.14 17.44 20.93 6.98 30.23 2.33 13.95 
 
100 
Ġç Anadolu  
(Central Anatolia) 0.00 8.33 10.56 30.56 10.56 31.11 3.89 5.00 
 
100 
Marmara  
(Marmara) 0.00 7.36 7.98 24.54 12.27 41.10 4.29 2.45 
 
100 
Karadeniz  
(Black Sea) 0.00 5.47 12.44 35.82 11.44 18.41 2.49 13.93 
 
100 
 
Total  0.00 7.41 12.31 29.63 10.41 29.73 3.20 7.31 
 
100 
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Table 3.7: Educational Background of the Local Party Chairpersons of the CHP 
by Region (2012) 
Educational Background of the CHP by Region (2012)  
Region 
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Akdeniz  
(Mediterranean) 0.93 12.96 12.04 30.56 0.00 36.11 0.93 6.48 
 
100 
Doğu Anadolu  
(Eastern Anatolia) 3.60 11.51 12.95 28.06 0.00 13.67 0.72 29.50 
 
100 
Ege  
(Aegean) 1.44 10.07 8.63 25.18 0.72 43.17 0.72 10.07 
 
100 
Güneydoğu Anadolu  
(Southeastern Anatolia) 4.55 15.91 18.18 30.68 0.00 13.64 0.00 17.05 
 
100 
Ġç Anadolu  
(Central Anatolia) 4.37 12.02 12.57 28.96 0.00 25.14 0.55 16.39 
 
100 
Marmara  
(Marmara) 1.81 7.23 6.63 28.92 0.00 45.78 1.20 8.43 
 
100 
Karadeniz  
(Black Sea) 5.19 9.43 8.49 30.19 0.00 31.60 2.83 12.26 
 
100 
 
Total 3.29 10.82 10.72 28.89 0.10 30.82 1.16 14.20 
 
100 
 
Differently from each other, the AKP has more university graduates in 
Güneydoğu Anadolu compared to the CHP does; however, the CHP has more 
chairpersons with bachelor degrees in Karadeniz region relatively to the AKP. Thus, a 
visible difference between parties rises in terms of Karadeniz and Güneydoğu Anadolu 
regions. Nevertheless, overall, Doğu Anadolu region seems to be the one with least 
university graduated chairpersons.  
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3.2.5. Occupation and Job 
Among other studies, occupation and job variables seem to be the most difficult 
ones for comparative studies. Various occupations and jobs make the comparison 
problematic. In order to eliminate the problems faced while analyzing the occupational 
backgrounds, certain classifications have been created by different institutions. One of 
the most prevailing categorizations is ISCO88. According to this classification, the 
political party elites group drop under the category of “legislators, senior officials and 
managers” (Ganzeboom and Treiman, 1996: 221). However, for understanding the main 
similarities and differences between the AKP and CHP, analyzing the personal 
occupation and job background of the local elites will yield distinguishing elements.  
 Before calculating the results, certain categories have been defined in order to 
make generalizations among dozens of the occupations and jobs.
19
 Table 3.8 reveals 
these categories and the number of the chairpersons who drop in the categories for each 
party. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 Categories of the occupations/jobs have been defined by a combination of different 
sources and the data. First of all, the main source has been the ISCO88 categories (see, 
e.g. Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996). Along with this source, considering the data of the 
thesis, the categories defined in the previous studies on Turkish political elite (the 
relevant ones) has been included (see, e.g. Sayarı and Dikici-Bilgin, 2011; Çarkoğlu et 
al., 2000). Finally, 23 occupation/job categories (including “other” and excluding “not 
available”) have been created in total.  
 
Among the categories, “Professional Occupations” includes serbest meslek in Turkish 
as Çarkoğlu et al. (2000) suggested earlier. Moreover, “Business/Trade” is resembled 
the category of Corporate Managers and Small Enterprise General Managers of 
ISCO88; “Dentist, Pharmacy and Veterinary Medicine” is under the Health 
Professionals category of ISCO88, the doctors have been also included in this thesis; 
union and cooperative leaders have been included under the Senior Officials Special-
Interest Organizations category of ISCO88; and lastly, mukhtars have been included in 
the Senior Local Government Officials of ISCO88.  
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Table 3.8: Occupational Background of the Local Party Chairpersons of the AKP 
and the CHP, 2012 
Occupational Background of the Local Party Chairpersons of  
the AKP and the CHP (2012) 
Occupation/Job AKP Local 
Chairpersons 
AKP Local 
Chairpersons 
(%) 
CHP Local 
Chairpersons 
CHP Local 
Chairpersons 
(%) 
Academic 0 0% 1 0% 
Accountants 33 3% 30 3% 
Agriculture 9 1% 70 7% 
Art and Architecture 6 1% 4 0% 
Artisan 85 9% 198 19% 
Business/Trader 112 11% 13 1% 
Constable (Emniyet Mensubu) 54 5% 0 0% 
Dentist, Pharmacy and 
Veterinary Medicine (including 
medicine) 
25 3% 21 2% 
Engineering 21 2% 26 3% 
Government 4 0% 0 0% 
Housewife 0 0% 6 1% 
Journalism 3 0% 4 0% 
Labor 3 0% 61 6% 
Lawyer 75 8% 41 4% 
Politician 1 0% 0 0% 
Professional Occupation 52 5% 130 13% 
Religion 2 0% 0 0% 
Retired 67 7% 195 19% 
Senior Local Government 
Official 
11 1% 3 0% 
Senior Official Special-Interest 
Organizations 
6 1% 1 0% 
Student 0 0% 3 0% 
Teachers 2 0% 40 4% 
Other 16 2% 25 2% 
Not Available 412 41% 163 16% 
Total 999 100% 1035 100% 
 
 Distinctive from the other social background variables analyzed above, 
significant differences becomes visible in terms of occupational backgrounds of the 
chairpersons of the AKP and the CHP. The first difference arises from the 
Business/Trader (including corporate managers and small enterprise general managers) 
category. Although an important portion of the AKP local chairpersons occupy this 
category, an extremely small number of the CHP chairpersons do so. This case may 
yield that an economically powerful group is located among the AKP chairpersons. On 
the other hand, artisans (including esnaf) occupy a significant place in the CHP with 
19% of the total which means traditional occupations cover an important part of the 
occupational backgrounds of the chairpersons. However, contrary to this, the CHP has 
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also an important proportion of laborers compared to the AKP. The amount of workers, 
who have been important elements of social democracy and left wing parties, could be 
the explaining factor here as CHP is generally perceived to be on the left side of the 
ideological spectrum. However, such occupations such as engineering and medicine 
(both reflect modernity as well) are very similar in number for both parties.  
 
Another intriguing finding is that 5% of the AKP chairpersons are constables 
[emniyet mensubu]. While the CHP does not have a chairperson who is or has been a 
constable, the number of these people who work in the AKP is noteworthy. This 
emphasis is because the AKP seems to be prone to recruiting people from police forces 
while the CHP is not. On the other hand, the CHP override the AKP in terms of 
professional occupations and retired categories. Apparently the portion of the retired 
people in the CHP is almost same as are the artisans. Among these retired people, 
teachers are common for both parties. However, unlike each other, the AKP‟s retired 
people contain the religious functionaries (like imam) whereas the CHP‟s retired ones 
contain the military members. 
 
With regard to retired members, analyzing the age range of these chairpersons 
may yield some clues about their future goals. As it is mentioned previously, the local 
chairpersons are potential upper level elites. Thus, in the future, they may occupy upper 
level positions than the provincial and district chair positions. Regarding this issue, one 
may expect that relatively younger chairpersons can be more prone to seek upper level 
positions in party politics compared to the older ones. This expectation is because; the 
younger ones have relatively more years to devote to politics than the older elites. 
Moreover, the younger ones may have more energy to consume in their upward political 
mobility and ambition for reaching their future goals. Although the older ones may also 
have such energy and ambition, they may have less motivation to climb the ladders for 
upper positions in politics after a certain age. Thus, the age of retired people may reveal 
some clues about their intentions. For example, if the average age of these people is 
high, one may expect that they will generally stay in those positions rather than try to 
reach higher political echelons. If the number of such people increases in a party, an 
accumulation of older people in those positions may emerge. This is because, if the 
younger ones seek to have upper positions and if they occupy provincial and district 
chairs in order to reach those places in the future, the circulation of these elites may be 
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faster than opposite one. Meaning that, the older ones may occupy their positions for 
more years compared to younger ones. Keeping these in mind, an analysis of the age of 
retired chairpersons may yield a helpful explanation. As Table 3.8 shows, the average 
age of the retired chairpersons of the AKP is 58,25 and the average age of the retired 
chairpersons of the CHP is 60 which is very near to the AKP‟s. However, the proportion 
of these people within the two parties differs from each other.  
 
Table 3.9: Age Range of the Retired (from occupations) Local Party Chairpersons of  
the AKP and the CHP (2012) 
Age Range of the Retired (from occupations) Local Party Chairpersons by Party 
Party Retirees  
(in number) 
Average Age Min. Age Max. Age Std. Dev.  
(for age) 
AKP 67 58.25 49 71 8.57 
CHP 195 60 43 79 9.46 
 
 As indicated before, the retired chair persons occupy fourth biggest portion 
within the AKP whereas they occupy the second biggest portion in the CHP. Combining 
this fact with the above - mentioned expectations, it is possible to say that the 
circulation of the chairpersons in the CHP is lower than in the AKP.  
 
 While analyzing the occupational backgrounds or jobs of the political party 
elites, one of the criteria has been “spare time” which enables the individuals to deal 
with politics in the harsh political competition. Earlier studies have revealed that the 
proportion of those chairpersons who are employers and/or work for themselves (free 
lances) at their own workplaces have been generally significant. To illustrate, Uysal and 
Topak‟s study unearthed that 77% of the local political party elites in Turkey between 
2007 and 2009 were the members of these two groups mentioned in the previous 
sentence (Uysal and Topak, 2010: 48). Comparing the AKP and the CHP, the 
importance of the time to spend for politics seem to be noteworthy. The AKP has many 
businessmen and traders while the CHP has many retired individuals as local party 
chairpersons. Nonetheless, the AKP has also a considerable amount (7%) of retired 
individuals although it is much less than the CHP‟s. Thus, relying on Uysal and Topak‟s 
argument, it is possible to interpret that these two parties incorporate those who may 
have relatively more spare time compared to the ones who are permanent employees, 
workers or public servants.  
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Nevertheless, as these authors also argued, the spare time criterion is limited in 
explaining the political participation of these elites. Along with this criterion, 
considering the financing of the politics may also yield important clues about who (can) 
occupies the local chair position of the political parties (Uysal and Topak, 2010: 48-49). 
Financing of the political parties have been a crucial focus of discussions. Several 
studies have remarked different financial sources of Turkish political parties (Ayata, 
1992; Schüler, 1999; Gençkaya, 2000; Uysal and Topak 2010) and the main financial 
resources of the political parties seem to be coming from donations. Although the SPK 
and the party by-laws regulate the possible and allowed financial resources, certain 
measures have been taken in order to gain financial support. For example, one of these 
alternative sources for the CHP has been the support of the wealthy members (other 
than party elites) of the party (Ayata, 1992: 262).  
 
Along with such financial support, party elites‟ own support has been another 
undeniable source of party financing for both the AKP and the CHP. Previous research 
proves this situation. For example, Ayata indicated in her study that the district 
chairperson of TaĢlık was bearing the routine expenses of the party (Ayata, 1992: 262). 
Likewise, Uysal and Topak came up with the fact that the expenses of the party in 
ordinary times (excluding the election periods) are covered by the local chairpersons, or 
at best by the members of the local executive branches of the parties (Uysal and Topak, 
2010: 51). Since businessmen and traders are quite likely wealthier than workers and 
artisans, they can provide more financial resources for the parties by themselves. This, 
in turn, may create a tendency to recruit wealthier individuals as chairpersons by parties. 
The results of the data analysis remark that the AKP has such a tendency. On the other 
hand, the CHP as left wing party seems to be less prone or able to recruit businessmen 
and traders compared to the AKP.     
 
 As a last point, wealth of the local chairpersons may also be an important factor 
in terms of clientelistic ties along with the effects of localism degrees mentioned in 
previous sections. As the wealth of a local chairperson increases, his/her chance to 
provide financial/material support to the party and the electorate may increase as well. 
If the political parties want their local chairpersons to finance their own branches, then 
they may select wealthier people for chair positions. Moreover, political parties, which 
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are prone to recruit wealthier chairpersons, may build up more personal ties with the 
electorate with the help of these chairpersons. With regard to the results of this thesis, 
especially to the localism and occupational background findings, both the AKP and the 
CHP seem to have possible clientelistic tendencies. However, the AKP seem to be more 
prone to use such ties than the CHP with regard to occupational composition of the 
party. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION 
Social backgrounds of political elites influence the political culture of the 
countries and vice versa. These elites occupy positions which enable them to control 
material and human resources, and be key factors in decision - making processes. Thus, 
their socioeconomic characteristics, attitudes and beliefs may shape these controlling 
and decision making processes. Regarding the importance of these elites, a fairly large 
body of researchers across various countries has conducted studies in order to unearth 
the impact of political elites on politics.  
As a subset of political elites, political party elites have a big influence on the 
functioning and ideological positions of their political parties. Their socioeconomic 
backgrounds may become defining factors of the features of the political parties. More 
specifically, with the help of examining age, gender, place of birth, education, 
occupation/job of local party elites, analyzing the socioeconomic composition of the 
parties is possible. By studying the incumbents of these positions, many social, cultural 
and economic characteristics of party grassroots can be unearthed as well. Furthermore, 
such studies enable developing a more comprehensive understanding about the ties, 
similarities and differences between the party elites and the electorate. Thus, the 
examination of socio-cultural and economic characteristics of the local political party 
elites makes it possible to unearth who is elected to represent the electorate at the 
grassroots level of party organizations. Thus, comparing different parties in terms of the 
similarities and differences of the socioeconomic and demographical characteristics of 
their local party elites yield interesting clues about why and how these political parties 
differ on policies as well as ideological positions on most political issues that Turkey 
faces.  
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In Turkey, political party elites have been subject of several (yet few) studies. 
Each study dealing with the local party elites of Turkey has employed a sample of the 
elites for their analysis. Most of these studies depended on the information gathered 
from interviews with the local political elites, and surveys answered by these elites. 
Although these studies have been prominent, the samples may create certain problems 
in terms of generalizability of the findings. Thus, the data analyzed in this thesis consist 
of the biographical information about almost all local party chairpersons of the AKP 
and the CHP across Turkey, and the social backgrounds of 2034 chairpersons have been 
examined.     
By analyzing the main characteristics of personal profiles of the current leaders 
of the provincial and district branches of the AKP and the CHP, this thesis suggested 
answers to the question of “What are the political consequences of similarities and 
differences in the socioeconomic profiles of the local party chairpersons for the these 
two parties in Turkey?” In order to answer this question; age, gender, place of birth, 
education, occupation/job of provincial and district chairpersons of the AKP and the 
CHP have been examined.  
The data and findings showed that the composition of local party chairpersons of 
the AKP and the CHP slightly differ from each other in terms of age, gender and 
educational backgrounds. Firstly, the average age of the AKP local chairpersons is 
younger than the CHP‟s age by 5 years. While 41-45 age groups cover the biggest 
amount of the AKP local party chairpersons, it becomes 51-55 for the CHP case. This 
fact suggests that the AKP has relatively younger chairpersons than CHP does; 
however, the difference between these parties is not so extreme. Nevertheless, both 
parties recruit older people as local chairpersons compared to the age composition of 
Turkish society which is much younger. Thus, the representation of the younger ones, 
who occupy a big proportion in Turkey, becomes limited and problematic. This is not a 
desired situation for a democratic system which requires the representation of different 
parts of a society as much as possible, thus, encouraging more participation and 
representation of the younger people may contribute to the consolidation of democratic 
elements for both the AKP and the CHP internally, and for Turkey as a whole. 
Secondly, in terms of gender distribution, the composition of the chairpersons of 
the AKP and the CHP are almost the same. Data reveals that the AKP has only 3 
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females out of 999 chairpersons, and the CHP has 21 females out of 1035 chairpersons. 
Supporting the findings of previous studies, for both parties, the proportions of the 
females are extremely small. This means that neither of the parties shows effort for 
creating female friendly party structure in the provincial and district chair levels. 
Similar to the problems about the “representation of the younger part of the society” 
mentioned in previous paragraph, the low level of female participation may also create 
problems for a democratic system. As it is indicated, the number of females is 
dramatically low not only in local party chair positions but also in mayoral and 
municipal council membership positions in Turkey. This situation causes 
underrepresentation of women in these places. Meaning that, almost 50% of Turkish 
society fail to be represented in these local positions. Moreover, this affects the internal 
party democracy in a negative way as well. This seems to be because, only a few 
women can participate in the decision-making processes in both the AKP and the CHP. 
Thus, their voice is very limited in these processes. Although women enjoy the same 
rights with the male counterparts in terms of their positions, their low number may 
cause them to have less chance to highlight their interests, ideas and suggestions. 
Moreover, a male dominated party structure may cause these women not to reach upper 
levels as well. Especially for the parties which want their members to be experienced 
about grassroots politics before occupying the upper levels in the party, the chance of 
the women who seek to reach upper levels will be low compared to male party 
members. For example, previous research showed that for upper level positions the 
AKP has a tendency to recruit women who had experienced the working principles of 
lower level positions (Tür and Çıtak, 2010: 620). However, the data show that the 
women can find very few places in local party chair positions. Thus, the chance of 
women to be in the upper level positions is already limited which creates a gender based 
representation problem for internal party democracy. Encouraging (to participate) and 
recruiting more women for such positions may yield some solutions (as a first step) for 
eliminating such problems of both parties.  
Thirdly, educational backgrounds of the local party chairpersons of the two 
parties resemble each other. Going along with the earlier studies and their results, the 
chairpersons tend to be university graduates. This may yield that both parties have more 
or less modernized elites in terms of educational backgrounds. Nevertheless, regional 
differences about educational backgrounds are obvious. As indicated, Marmara region 
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is the one with the highest levels of education of local party chairpersons of both the 
AKP and the CHP. However, Doğu Anadolu region has the least number of 
chairpersons with bachelors' degrees in total. For both parties, this fact may seem to be a 
point to focus on. Although both parties have higher educated chairpersons compared to 
the education level of Turkish society, low education levels of the parties in Doğu 
Anadolu region decrease the overall education levels. For both the AKP and the CHP, 
analyzing the reasons of such low levels in education in this region may build up helpful 
solutions for this problem. For examples, these parties may create regional policies in 
order to increase education levels for both themselves and the society as a whole.  
With regard to the representation and recruitment of the young and women in 
local chair positions of the parties, an important common point is about the quality of 
the parties as institutions. Here, by quality, the proper and proportional representation of 
different parts of the society is meant. For example, Acemoğlu unearthed the 
importance of the role of political institutions in democratization processes and 
underlined that these “political institutions regulate the allocation of de jure political 
power” (Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2006: 173). As institutions, political parties also 
regulate such an allocation within themselves. Thus, who and which groups will have 
such political power may be determined by the recruitment patterns of the parties. Thus, 
if the amount of young people and females is very limited among a party‟s local chairs, 
these people cannot find enough chance to have political power and control it. Due to 
this reason, the quality of these institutions, specifically the parties, will be affected 
negatively in terms of representation. Although these parties seem to operate as 
democratic institutions, such problems about the emergence of different groups in the 
party would decrease the quality of democratic elements of them.     
Fourthly, previous research remarked that localism degrees of the political party 
elites vary depending on the socioeconomic characteristics of the cities and regions. 
While localism is low in the migrant-receiving areas, it increases in migrant-sending 
places (Tachau, 1973; Çarkoğlu et al., 2000). However the data reveal that neither the 
AKP nor the CHP shows a similar trend with the previous findings in terms of localism. 
Only in Ġstanbul the localism degrees are low for both parties, but even in this city 
parties have at least 50% localism. Thus, the findings suggest that the localism degrees 
are high for both parties which, in turn, may enable these parties to build up proximal 
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and personal ties with the electorate or certain critical communities and segments of 
their local societies.   
Last but definitely not the least, although the AKP and the CHP seem similar to 
each other in terms of age, gender and education variables, their composition 
dramatically differ in terms of occupational background of their local party elites. Thus, 
this thesis suggests that the occupational background of the local party chairpersons of 
the AKP and the CHP is the most distinctive factor for analyzing the differences 
between these two parties. This finding supports the previous research done by Uysal 
and Topak who concluded that the relation networks of the political parties in Turkey 
have been based on occupations and jobs (Uysal and Topak, 2010: 49). According to 
the data, while businessmen and traders have the biggest portion in the AKP local party 
chairpersons, a significant portion of the CHP local party chairpersons are consist of 
retired individuals and artisans. Moreover, the CHP seems to be more prone to 
recruiting workers as chairpersons than the AKP. Overall, these may yield that in terms 
of occupational compositions the AKP stands on the right side of the ideological 
spectrum with the help of capitalist characteristics of its local party chairpersons while 
the CHP reveals more social democratic characteristics. Beyond these, businessmen and 
traders generally seek opportunities nationally or even globally, thus they are not so 
locally oriented in terms of their interests. This may make them deal more with national 
tasks rather than local issues. Meaning that, their interests may rely on national politics. 
On the other hand, artisans (including esnaf) are generally much more locally oriented 
with regard to their interests. Thus, the domestic economic interests may be primary for 
artisans rather than national economic issues. Regarding these issues, the local 
chairpersons of the AKP seem to orient themselves less toward just the local interests 
per se, whereas the chairpersons of the CHP seems to be more locally oriented in terms 
of their political and career interests. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A.1: Female Mayors of Turkey by Province and District                                 
(after 2009 Local Elections) 
Female Mayors of Turkey by Province and District  
(after 2009 Local Elections) 
Province District Party 
Afyonkarahisar Bolvadin MHP 
Ağrı Doğubayazıt BDP 
Aydın  CHP 
Aydın Ġncirliova CHP 
Diyarbakır Bağlar BDP 
Diyarbakır Bismil BDP 
Diyarbakır Eğil BDP 
Diyarbakır Lice BDP 
Edirne Kurtbey CHP 
EskiĢehir Mahmudiye AKP 
Gaziantep Islahiye Independent 
Giresun DoğaNkent AKP 
Hakkari Yüksekova BDP 
Hatay YeĢilköy AKP 
Iğdır Aralık AKP 
Iğdır Melekli CHP 
Kırklareli Kavaklı CHP 
Konya Adsız CHP 
Mardin  Derik BDP 
Mardin  Nusaybin BDP 
Mardin  YeĢilalan BDP 
Muğla Bafa CHP 
MuĢ Varto BDP 
Tunceli  BDP 
Van Bostaniçi BDP 
ġanlıurfa ViranĢehir BDP 
ġırnak Uludere BDP 
Sources: http://www.tbb.gov.tr/online/baskanlar-albumu/ 
   http://www.aralik.bel.tr/baskan.asp 
   http://www.bolvadin.bel.tr/Belediye/Belediye_Baskani 
   http://www.aralik.bel.tr/baskan.asp 
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Table A.2: Birth Places of the Local Party Chairpersons of the AKP by Province 
(2012) 
Province Nonlocal-
Born 
Local-
Born 
Total  Province Nonlocal-
Born 
Local-
Born 
Total 
ADANA 1 14 15  KARAMAN 2 4 6 
ADIYAMAN 1 10 11  KARS 2 9 11 
AFYONKARAHĠSAR 3 15 18  KASTAMONU 1 21 22 
AĞRI 1 6 7  KAYSERĠ 2 10 12 
AKSARAY 1 5 6  KIRIKKALE 0 7 7 
AMASYA 0 8 8  KIRKLARELĠ 1 8 9 
ANKARA 1 18 19  KIRġEHĠR 1 7 8 
ANTALYA 3 13 16  KĠLĠS 1 4 5 
ARDAHAN 1 7 8  KOCAELĠ 4 5 9 
ARTVĠN 1 6 7  KONYA 2 27 29 
AYDIN 1 12 13  KÜTAHYA 2 13 15 
BALIKESĠR 3 13 16  MALATYA 7 14 21 
BARTIN 2 3 5  MANĠSA 2 15 17 
BATMAN 0 5 5  MARDĠN 0 11 11 
BAYBURT 1 4 5  MERSĠN 1 10 11 
BĠLECĠK 1 4 5  MUĞLA 1 7 8 
BĠNGÖL 1 8 9  MUġ 2 6 8 
BĠTLĠS 3 6 9  NEVġEHĠR 2 7 9 
BOLU 2 10 12  NĠĞDE 1 6 7 
BURDUR 2 6 8  ORDU 5 17 22 
BURSA 1 9 10  OSMANĠYE 2 7 9 
ÇANAKKALE 4 10 14  RĠZE 5 12 17 
ÇANKIRI 1 10 11  SAKARYA 4 12 16 
ÇORUM 2 14 16  SAMSUN 2 16 18 
DENĠZLĠ 1 15 16  SĠĠRT 3 6 9 
DĠYARBAKIR 0 16 16  SĠNOP 1 9 10 
DÜZCE 2 8 10  SĠVAS 3 18 21 
EDĠRNE 1 8 9  ġANLIURFA 3 11 14 
ELAZIĞ 0 7 7  ġIRNAK 0 7 7 
ERZĠNCAN 3 8 11  TEKĠRDAĞ 0 6 6 
ERZURUM 5 19 24  TOKAT 0 10 10 
ESKĠġEHĠR 4 11 15  TRABZON 13 19 32 
GAZĠANTEP 1 9 10  TUNCELĠ 1 8 9 
GĠRESUN 1 10 11  UġAK 0 6 6 
GÜMÜġHANE 4 7 11  VAN 1 12 13 
HAKKARĠ 0 4 4  YALOVA 0 3 3 
HATAY 1 12 13  YOZGAT 4 13 17 
IĞDIR 1 5 6  ZONGULDAK 3 7 10 
ISPARTA 1 9 10  BELGIUM 1 0 1 
ĠSTANBUL 11 11 22  GERMANY 6 0 6 
ĠZMĠR 5 16 21  N/A 31 0 31 
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KAHRAMANMARAġ 3 10 13      
KARABÜK 0 5 5  Grand Total 203 796 999 
 
Table A.3: Birth Places of the Local Party Chairpersons of the CHP by Province 
(2012) 
Province Nonlocal-
Born 
Local-
Born 
Total  Province Nonlocal-
Born 
Local-
Born 
Total 
ADANA 2 12 14  KARABÜK 0 5 5 
ADIYAMAN 1 11 12  KARAMAN 1 7 8 
AFYONKARAHĠSAR 3 17 20  KARS 4 7 11 
AĞRI 3 8 11  KASTAMONU 2 18 20 
AKSARAY 0 7 7  KAYSERĠ 1 13 14 
AMASYA 1 6 7  KIRIKKALE 0 9 9 
ANKARA 4 16 20  KIRKLARELĠ 2 7 9 
ANTALYA 1 14 15  KIRġEHĠR 1 7 8 
ARDAHAN 4 7 11  KĠLĠS 0 4 4 
ARTVĠN 3 9 12  KOCAELĠ 4 4 8 
AYDIN 0 9 9  KONYA 3 27 30 
BALIKESĠR 3 15 18  KÜTAHYA 0 11 11 
BARTIN 0 3 3  MALATYA 3 15 18 
BATMAN 0 7 7  MANĠSA 2 15 17 
BAYBURT 0 4 4  MARDĠN 2 9 11 
BĠLECĠK 0 6 6  MERSĠN 1 8 9 
BĠNGÖL 1 8 9  MUĞLA 0 9 9 
BĠTLĠS 1 7 8  MUġ 4 7 11 
BOLU 2 8 10  NEVġEHĠR 1 6 7 
BURDUR 0 9 9  NĠĞDE 1 5 6 
BURSA 1 14 15  ORDU 3 21 24 
ÇANAKKALE 0 9 9  OSMANĠYE 0 7 7 
ÇANKIRI 1 9 10  RĠZE 3 14 17 
ÇORUM 2 15 17  SAKARYA 2 12 14 
DENĠZLĠ 3 19 22  SAMSUN 2 16 18 
DĠYARBAKIR 3 11 14  SĠĠRT 1 7 8 
DÜZCE 0 7 7  SĠNOP 3 10 13 
EDĠRNE 0 8 8  SĠVAS 1 16 17 
ELAZIĞ 2 11 13  ġANLIURFA 1 8 9 
ERZĠNCAN 6 8 14  ġIRNAK 0 8 8 
ERZURUM 4 19 23  TEKĠRDAĞ 1 7 8 
ESKĠġEHĠR 1 15 16  TOKAT 1 10 11 
GAZĠANTEP 4 9 13  TRABZON 8 19 27 
GĠRESUN 1 11 12  TUNCELĠ 8 9 17 
GÜMÜġHANE 1 7 8  UġAK 1 3 4 
HAKKARĠ 0 3 3  VAN 0 11 11 
HATAY 1 13 14  YALOVA 0 1 1 
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IĞDIR 0 4 4  YOZGAT 6 12 18 
ISPARTA 1 12 13  ZONGULDAK 1 5 6 
ĠSTANBUL 8 8 16  GERMANY 3 0 3 
ĠZMĠR 2 15 17  BULGARIA 1 0 1 
KAHRAMANMARAġ 3 11 14  N/A 74 0 74 
     Grand Total 225 810 1035 
 
 
Table A.4: Provinces of Turkey by Region 
Provinces of Turkey by Region 
Region Provinces 
Akdeniz (Mediterranean) Adana, Antalya, Burdur, Hatay, Isparta, KahramanmaraĢ, Mersin, 
Osmaniye 
Doğu Anadolu (Eastern 
Anatolia) 
Ağrı, Ardahan, Bingöl, Bitlis, Elazığ, Erzincan, Erzurum, Hakkari, 
Iğdır, Kars, Malatya, MuĢ, Tunceli, Van 
Ege (Aegean) Afyonkarahisar, Aydın, Denizli, Ġzmir, Kütahya, Manisa, Muğla, 
UĢak  
Güneydoğu Anadolu 
(Southeastern Anatolia) 
Adıyaman, Batman, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Mardin, Siirt, ġanlıurfa, 
ġırnak, Kilis 
Ġç Anadolu (Central Anatolia) Aksaray, Ankara, Çankırı, EskiĢehir, Karaman, Kayseri, Kırıkkale, 
KırĢehir, Konya, NevĢehir, Niğde, Sivas, Yozgat 
Marmara (Marmara) Balıkesir, Bilecik, Bursa, Çanakkale, Edirne, Ġstanbul, Kırklareli, 
Kocaeli, Sakarya, Tekirdağ, Yalova 
Karadeniz (Black Sea) Amasya, Artvin, Bartın, Bayburt, Bolu, Çorum, Düzce, Giresun, 
GümüĢhane, Karabük, Kastamonu, Ordu, Rize, Samsun, Sinop, 
Tokat, Trabzon, Zonguldak  
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